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Abstract 
 The contemporary mainstream media offers passionate praise for China’s recent 
improvements regarding renewable energy generation and sustainability.  However, such articles 
make deliberate comparisons of these achievements to the state of China less than a decade ago, 
with the nation’s dense smog posing a public health crisis for the Chinese people.  In this thesis, I 
step back into history to examine the environmental policy message promoted by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong to better understand China’s swift turnaround and 
present-day environmental policy.  The existing body of literature provides ample evidence of 
the land-use change and pollution that arose in the Maoist Era, though little attention is paid to 
Mao’s environmental policy message that led to said environmental degradation.  Using People’s 
Daily newspaper articles and propaganda posters, I uncover clues that Mao crafted an 
environmental policy message of utopian urgency and a conflict that pitted man against the 
fundamental functions of the environment.  Additionally, I argue that Mao’s environmental 
policy was important for the broader goals of the CCP as it was used to exert political control 
over China’s citizens.  Although many facets of Mao’s environmental policy were 
anthropocentric, I also argue that Chinese print and visual media began to promote norms of 
environmental conservation in the 1960s and 1970s.  Finally, I conclude with a discussion of 
how these emerging norms of conservation as well as Mao’s anthropocentric attitudes towards 
nature have contributed to the contradictory environmental policy outcomes we see from China 
today.   
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Introduction 
China’s appearance in international news today often highlights its recent improvements 
in air quality and renewable energy generation.  These articles deliberately compare these recent 
achievements to the state of the nation less than a decade ago, when China was still being 
shamed for the nation’s dense smog and the catastrophic threat it posed for public health.   As 
those articles exemplify, the rate at which the Chinese have turned the tides regarding sustainable 
development is incredibly noteworthy.  The most instrumental factor for this change has been 
political dominance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  The CCP has been developing 
environmental policy measures at an extremely high rate over the past decade, leading to the 
current instrumental progress.  For example, approximately two months ago, China passed a new 
fishing ban over the Yangtze River, which has suffered through several tumultuous decades of 
severe water pollution issues. 1  Although China has made remarkable improvements in 
sustaining the environment in such a short time period, China’s integrity regarding sustainability 
remains questionable.  The underlying problem with China’s approach towards environmental 
governance is that it is almost entirely non-participatory.  The public has no role as a stakeholder 
in environmental policy discussions and environmental injustices are common.  Although smog 
and public health have improved in Beijing, the ethnic minority Uyghur population in Xinjiang 
province is experiencing worsening air pollution as CCP-backed corporations have been 
constructing factories to tap into the resource-rich province.2  Understanding this contradictory 
environmental policy is a highly intriguing analytical question.   
 
1 Yan, Alice. 2020. “China Passes Law to Protect Yangtze River.” South China Morning Post. 2020. 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3115431/china-passes-law-protect-river-yangtze. 
2 Uyghur Human Rights Project. 2020. “UHRP: On Earth Day, UHRP Calls for Environmental Justice in East 
Turkistan.” Uyghur Times. 2020. https://uighurtimes.com/index.php/uhrp-on-earth-day-uhrp-calls-for-
environmental-justice-in-east-turkistan/. 
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Many contemporary historical analyses provide strong evidence of forestry loss, soil 
erosion, and the excessive use of pesticide that occurred when Mao Zedong was leader of China 
(1949-1976).  But, less critical attention has been paid to expanding the understanding of how 
the environmental politics of Mao contributed to said land-use change and pollution.  Arguably 
the most influential argument for policy motives behind the environmental degradation lies 
within Judith Shapiro’s book Mao’s War Against Nature, which investigates the pervasive anti-
nature sentiment of Mao Zedong and his party in Chinese politics, history, and philosophy. 3  Her 
argument comes from a series of interviews of Chinese citizens who grew up during Mao’s 
revolution complimented with existing primary and secondary sources.  Mao believed that an 
economic revolution driven by gaining political power over China’s large population would not 
be possible without persuading the masses extensively through the media.  Mao needed a method 
to inspire the populace to work 14-hour days cutting down trees to expand the land used for 
growing grain.  When I contacted Shapiro directly, her statement that she was uncertain of the 
exact environmental policy message in both print and visual propaganda spearheaded this 
research project, starting with China’s People’s Daily newspaper archive.4   
In this thesis, I argue that print and visual media contributed towards not only the 
environmental degradation during the Maoist Era, but also the recent upsurge in environmental 
conservation efforts in modern-day China.  The Maoist Era, in this context, represents the range 
of years with the most significant policy reform under Mao’s leadership: 1958 to 1976.  The 
print media refers to the most widely-read newspaper during the Maoist Era: The People’s Daily. 
The People’s Daily newspaper database contains articles from 1946 to present day.  The articles 
 
3 Shapiro, Judith. 2001. Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
4 Shapiro, Judith. 2019. E-mail communication with author. September, 17, 2019. 
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published in the present are usually accessible without a subscription, though the older archival 
articles, such as those from the Maoist Era, require a subscription for access.  In some articles, 
the People’s Daily included complimentary photographs and, as this analysis encompasses both 
print and visual media, relevant photographs were also included in this study.  The slogans 
Shapiro mentions in her book—such as “encircle the rivers, build land” (weihe zaotian)—
narrowed down my searches in the archive.5  I found that gaizao ziran, or, “transform nature,” 
was one of the most useful search terms for zeroing in on articles that offered clues of Mao’s 
environmental policy, given how frequently the term reoccurs within the archive.  I refer to 
gaizao ziran––transform nature––throughout the four Chapters of analysis in this thesis, as it 
represented communication of Mao’s environmental policy in the media.   
It is worth noting that one of the largest limitations of my analysis of the newspaper was 
that I was only able to access the newspaper archive for a few weeks due to challenges related to 
the COVID-19 pandemic.  Because so, I was unable to conduct a thorough analysis and return to 
the archive when new questions arose during the critical reading process.    
The visual media I specifically analyzed are propaganda posters, primarily from Stefan 
Landsberger’s online propaganda poster archive and Artstor.  Chineseposters.net, where 
Landsberger’s propaganda posters are located, is an open access archive containing 
approximately 7 thousand propaganda posters, making it arguably the most comprehensive 
archive of Chinese propaganda posters available.  Landsberger has divided the posters he has 
collected into useful categorical themes––such as “Great Leap Forward” and “Cultural 
Revolution Campaigns.”6  These themes helped me narrow down smaller groups of posters for 
 
5Shapiro, 2001, Mao’s War Against Nature, 107. 
6 Landsberger, Stefan. n.d. “Themes.” Chineseposters.net. Accessed May 5, 2021. 
https://chineseposters.net/themes/index. 
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further content evaluation.  Also, the posters within the archive have tags associated with them to 
link together posters containing similar features.  For example, small-word phrases related to the 
factors of environmental degradation discussed in the existing literature––such as “dam” or 
“pesticide” ––also narrowed down my searches.  The other archive I used for propaganda 
posters, Arstor, was accessed through the University of Vermont Howe Library website.  Artstor 
is an online archive of museum artifacts of all varieties, including a small number of Chinese 
propaganda posters.  Although both Chineseposters.net and Arstor were included in this 
investigation, the majority of the propaganda posters that I discuss in this thesis come from 
Landsberger’s archive.         
Although other forms of propaganda were used by the CCP, such archival evidences are 
hard to obtain for analysis.  For this reason, propaganda posters and People’s Daily articles were 
chosen for analysis because of their accessibility and the sheer number of primary sources within 
those archives.   
Throughout the thesis, I occasionally make comparisons between Great Leap Forward 
(GLF) media attitudes towards the environment and Cultural Revolution (CR) media attitudes.  
Although the Cultural Revolution was not officially launched by the government until 1966, 
there had been previous ideological shifts in Chinese politics in the four years between the 
conclusion of the GLF and the start of the CR.  It is important to note that I consider propaganda 
from the aforementioned four-year span (1962-1966) as “Cultural Revolution propaganda,” as 
well.  
 In the “Research Problem Overview,” I explore scholarly works which discuss the extent 
of the environmental degradation that occurred in the Maoist Era.  Additionally, I provide an 
overview of the importance of propaganda, its relevance to my analysis, and the reasons other 
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than accessibility for analyzing propaganda.  I also identify the gaps in the literature that have 
motivated this thesis in that section.  
 Next, I move on to the main interpretive section of the thesis, which outlines the key 
components of Mao Zedong’s environmental policy.  In Chapter 1, I explore the facets of 
utopian urgency, that is, the tendency of Chinese environmental policy to prioritize efficiency 
over anything else.  The term “efficiency,” in this context refers to Mao’s goal of creating an 
incredibly strong Chinese economy that would rival the western superpowers.  As I outline in 
this first chapter, Mao supported expanding China’s economy by any means necessary, even at 
the expense of China’s natural flora and fauna.  Next, in Chapter 2, I argue that the Chinese 
government possessed a desire to take control over the natural functions of the environment in a 
self-made war that pitted humans and the natural world against each other.  Third, in Chapter 3, I 
discuss how Mao’s core ideological socialist thought was integrated into the environmental 
policy message during the Cultural Revolution.  More specifically, Mao promoted an ideology of 
anthropocentrism, or human superiority over the natural world.  In contrast with Shapiro’s 
arguments, in Chapter 4, I outline the desires for environmental conservation that emerged in the 
later years of the Maoist Era and the significance of those desires.   
 In light of those key components discussed in the four chapters of evaluation, in the 
Conclusion I offer my final thoughts on Mao’s anthropocentric environmental policy and how it 
parallels contemporary environmental policy in China.  However, I also make comparisons 
between China’s progressive environmental remediation efforts in the present and Mao’s 
environmental policy, showing that Mao’s policy was not entirely anti-nature.  At the very end of 
this thesis, I provide a few research questions raised from this project that I hope can be 
investigated in future studies.    
10 
 
From this analysis of print and visual media, I found an environmental policy that 
changed substantially over the course of the Maoist Era.  Mao’s environmental policy during the 
Great Leap Forward conveyed his apathy towards the environment.  The Communist Party 
rhetoric that promoted gaizao ziran meshed comfortably with a revolution that sought to develop 
as quickly and efficiently as possible, resulting in the environmental problems of the GLF.  
Afterwards, in the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s socialist sentiments prevailed in the 
environmental policy that helped to satisfy his goals of expanding political power over the 
people.  Environmental policy is often, especially in the propaganda posters, administered to the 
public through subliminal messages.  For example, subtle symbols of Mao’s expansionist 
environmental policy––such as hydroelectric dams and transmission towers––appeared in the 
background of propaganda images.  The economic failure of the Great Leap Forward ushered in 
new desires for the CCP to understand environmental conservation and such ideological shifts 
successfully foregrounded the environmental conservation efforts we see from China today.   
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Research Problem Overview 
Great Leap Forward Deforestation 
 Much of the contemporary scholarly literature and data support the conclusion that China 
suffered severe deforestation under Mao’s control.  As historian Mark Elvin writes, 
deforestation, or cutting down trees, is “the longest story in China’s environmental history.”1  
The Chinese were “just as hostile to forests, as they were fond of individual trees.”2  Mao’s Great 
Leap Forward plan for economic reform contributed to much of the loss of forest cover as Mao’s 
“Backyard Furnaces,” cohesively consumed the domestic lumber supply.  The “Backyard 
Furnaces,” were small, individually-operated furnaces constructed in the backyards of the 
peasants in an effort to boost China’s manufacturing sector through the smelting of steel.3  From 
1958-59, approximately 600,000 steel and iron-smelting furnaces were built in the communes to 
achieve Mao’s vision of rural industry.4  Those wood-fueled furnaces failed to yield much steel 
that could be refined for further use because the peasants operating them were largely untrained 
in smelting.5,6  One middle-aged woman, interviewed by Shapiro, describes her childhood 
smelting steel and cutting trees during the GLF: 
Before, this was all virgin forest, with pines a foot thick.  It was so dense that I was afraid 
to go there at night.  The brush and branches we gathered were enough for all our 
firewood needs.  We never had to cut the trees.  There were small animals, rabbits, and 
pheasants.  I was only ten or eleven during the Leap.  We collected scrap metal and pots 
while the grownups cut the trees.  The result was a big mess of melted steel. We turned it 
 
1 Elvin, Mark. 2004. The Retreat of Elephants. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 
2 Ibid., xvii. 
3 Economy, Elizabeth. 2010. The River Runs Black. Second. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
4 Zhang, Zhihong. 1999. “Rural Industrialization in China: From Backyard Furnaces to Township and Village 
Enterprises.” East Asia, 17 (3): 61–87. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-999-0023-y. 
5 Becker, Jasper. 1996. Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine. New York: The Free Press. 
6 Percival, Robert V. 2011. “China’s ‘Green Leap Forward’ Toward Global Environmental Leadership.” Vermont 
Journal of Environmental Law 12 (3): 633–57. https://doi.org/10.2307/vermjenvilaw.12.3.633. 
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over to the local steel factories to process further.  This was supposed to be the first step.  
But the temperature was too low.  Wood can never burn hot enough to make steel.7  
 
Furthermore, since the Chinese furnaces could not produce steel that could be smelted, the 
Chinese constructed tools and pulleys out of wood, further contributing to the decline in forest 
resources.  For this reason, it is estimated that, in only a few months during the Great Leap 
Forward, China’s forests declined by 10 percent.8  Along with fueling the furnaces, forests 
declined for the expansion of arable land for agriculture.  Additionally, land was also cleared of 
tress to construct housing in response to China’s population growth.9  This nationwide 
deforestation backfired on the Chinese farmers.  The lack of forested land led to soil erosion that 
hindered grain yields.10  When soil erodes, it often ends up in watersheds which can cause 
flooding and turbidity, limiting its usefulness for agriculture.11  A confluence of factors 
contributed to the famine, but the soil erosion and flooding certainly played a major role.  The 
former contributed to a 30-percent decline in agricultural production by the end of the Great 
Leap Forward in 1961.  By 1999, 38 percent of China’s domestic land was classified as poorly 
eroded, with much of that erosion occurring during the Great Leap Forward.12  
 Also, China has traditionally suffered from severe forest fires, and they were especially 
destructive in the period between 1950 and 1962.  From 1953 to 1957, forest fires resulted in the 
 
7 Shapiro, Judith. 2001. Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
8 Percival, 2011, China’s ‘Great Leap Forward,’ 1. 
9 Tian, Dexin, and Chin Chung Chao. 2010. “The Communication Model and the Nature of Change in Terms of 
Deforestation in China since 1949.” Applied Environmental Education and Communication. Vol. 9. Communication 
Faculty Publications. https://doi.org/10.1080/1533015X.2010.482493. 
10 Ibid., 1. 
11 Nagle, J. C. (2009). The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law. Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law, 24(2), 
203–252. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/42842904. 
12 Tian, 2010, The Communication Model. 
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loss of an estimated 23,307 * 104 cubic meters of burnt woods.13  Additionally, large bonfires 
were a common occurrence when people would gather at the commune headquarters for 
meetings, further contributing to deforestation.14    
      Despite the loss of forest cover during the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese did 
possess at least a rudimentary understanding of afforestation, that is, the construction of new 
forests.  In fact, many forest farms were built within the Chinese communes between 1957 and 
1960.15  Nevertheless, the trees were cut down at a much higher rate than they were being grown 
in this period.  Also, the subsidies for afforestation implemented in 1963 were shut down in 1966 
when the Chinese political system nearly collapsed with the start of the Cultural Revolution that 
perpetuated the overcutting and underplanting of trees.16  It was not until the 1980s that China 
would begin to see improvements in forestry policy and forest coverage statistics.  Even with that 
progress in the 1980s, it took the nation four decades to reach the level of forest cover prior to 
the Communist Party’s rise to power.  In 1949, it was estimated that China’s total forest cover 
was roughly 13-15 percent.17  In 1989, China’s forest coverage was listed by the Ministry of 
Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China at 12.98 percent,18 indicating that 
China made negligible progress regarding the expansion of forest coverage in that 40-year span. 
 
 
 
13 Zhong, Maohua, Weicheng Fan, Tiemin Liu, and Peide Li. 2003. “Statistical Analysis on Current Status of China 
Forest Fire Safety.” Fire Safety Journal 38 (3): 257–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0379-7112(02)00079-6. 
14 Shapiro, 2001, Mao’s War Against Nature, 83. 
15 Edmonds, Richard Louis. 1994. Patterns of China’s Lost Harmony. London and New York: Routledge. 
16 Ibid., 48. 
17 Tian, Dexin, and Chao, 2010, The Communication Model, 124. 
18 Ministry of Ecology and Environment of People’s Republic of China. 2002. “Bulletin on the State of China’s 
Environment in 1989.” Beijing. http://jcs.mee.gov.cn/hjzl/zkgb/1996/200211/t20021115_83139.shtml. 
14 
 
Mao Zedong’s Pest Campaigns  
 During the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese were hellbent on exterminating any natural 
pests that might interrupt Mao Zedong’s revolution.  This pest extermination campaign, lasting 
from 1958 to 1960, was dubbed the “Four Pests Campaign,” and it sought to eliminate four 
different species––flies, mosquitoes, rats, and sparrows.  This idea of purification, cleansing 
disease for the Chinese people, did not result in only those positive effects of purification.  In 
general, the Four Pests Campaign was an unmitigated disaster for China’s biodiversity and 
agriculture, especially due to its hostility to sparrows, which were targeted for their tendency to 
consume seeds needed for agriculture.  Yet, what such linear views overlook is that sparrows 
also naturally consume insects.  The dedication of the Chinese masses to exterminating sparrows 
resulted in a severe ecological imbalance, that led to the increase in locust population, killing 
much of the crops planted during the GLF.19  This anti-sparrow ideology was widely accepted 
and vitalized by the Chinese peasants and killing sparrows was even treated as an enjoyable 
leisure-time activity for young schoolchildren: 
It was fun to “Wipe out the Four Pests.”  The whole school went to kill sparrows.  We 
made ladders to knock down their nests, and beat gongs in the evenings, when they 
were coming home to roost.  It was many years before we knew that sparrows are good 
birds.  At the time, we only knew they ate grain.20 
 
In addition, this anti-pest ideology was not only reserved for sparrows and the other species of 
The Four Pests.  In his memoir of growing up during the Great Leap Forward, Sheldon Lou 
recalls how his village mates in the communes would attack birds of all different species, reciting 
chants as they did: 
 
19 Shapiro, 2001, Mao’s War Against Nature, 87. 
20Ibid., 87. 
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With the rhythm of the song, more birds, sparrows or not, dropped from the sky like 
stones. Suddenly a large light-gray bird landed on our roof a few feet from us.  Its wings 
extended limply; its chest undulated like a bellows.  It was exhausted, no doubt, and it 
was a pigeon.21  
 
Lou also mentions that people valorized smoking cigarettes during the Great Leap Forward to 
keep away the snakes.22  We can reflect that the hostility towards pests and diseases culminated 
to excessive insecticide use, especially during the Great Leap Forward.  It is estimated that 14.7 
kg of insecticide was used per hectare of grain.23  If we consider that the USA used less than 0.5 
kg per hectare of insecticide on corn in 1960, it suggests how the use of insecticide was 
excessive in China.24  As the Chinese insecticide was frequently made from natural species––for 
example, Anabasis Aphylla, consuming those plant species resulted in severe biodiversity loss.  
In that same year, 1958, approximately 500 different native plant species were used to make 10 
million tons of insecticide and fungicide.25  Similar to the consequences of the Four Pests 
Campaign, the excessive usage of pesticides backfired on the Chinese laborers, as the natural 
enemies of the plant hopper (Nilaparvata Lugens) were eliminated, paving way for this nasty 
insect to consume much of the rice that was farmed.26   
In the literature, little is known of the specific species that suffered biodiversity loss due 
to Maoist Era environmental degradation.  The destruction of habitat from deforestation led to a 
decline in China’s panda population, for instance, which teetered at extinction.27  As the 
 
21 Lou, Sheldon. 2005. Sparrows, Bedbugs, and Body Shadows. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
22 Ibid., 43. 
23 Tsai, James H. 1982. “Entomology in the People ’s Republic of China.” Journal of the New York Entomological 
Society 90 (3): 186–212. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25009316. 
24 Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge, Alex Vialou, Richard Nehring, Craig Osteen, Seth Wechsler, and Andrew Martin. 
2014. “Pesticide Use in U. S. Agriculture: 21 Selected Crops, 1960-2008.” USDA Economic Information Bulletin. 
Washington, D.C. http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/eib-economic-information-bulletin/eib124.aspx. 
25 Tsai, 1982, Entomology, 197. 
26 Edmonds, 1994, Patterns of China’s Lost Harmony, 149. 
27 Ibid., 28. 
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importance of a stable forest habitat is not only exclusive to the Giant Panda, it suggests that 
other species also had a large decline in population, such as tiger.28  Additionally, Mark Elvin 
argues in The Retreat of Elephants that China’s historical tendency of hostility towards animals 
has contributed to the current decline in biodiversity.  As the title of his book alludes, the Asian 
elephant population is in dire straits from habitat loss and China’s history of fascination with 
ivory and elephant tusks.29  Although the Asian elephant was placed on the CITES list of species 
that are illegal to hunt, poaching is still prevailing, and the ivory trade remains controversial in 
China.   
Industry, Hydropower, and Dirty Water 
 For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has been fascinated by largescale hydropower 
projects that will expand China’s energy generation, often at the expense of the environment.  In 
fact, the obsession with large hydropower dams in China did not begin following Mao Zedong’s 
takeover.  China’s “Three Gorges Dam,” one of the largest dam projects on earth, was originally 
proposed over 100 years ago by former Chinese political leader Sun Yat-Sen.  Large hydropower 
dams, while capable of extremely high energy generation, come with large environmental costs.  
Specifically, large hydropower dams account for far more land-use change than any other major 
energy source at 315.22 Acres per Megawatt of energy produced.30  Mao Zedong and the CCP 
brought Sun Yat-Sen’s vision of the Three Gorges Dam to fruition and began the construction in 
the 1950s.  As Bao Maohang argues, the Three Gorges Dam is a significant aspect of China’s 
history of water control given its location on the Yellow River.31  The Yellow River overflowed 
 
28 Nagle, 2009, The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law, 217.  
29 Elvin, 2004, Retreat of the Elephants, 1. 
30 Landon, S., P. Strata, Anderson Barrett, Colton Cowan, Katie Colton, and Dallin Johnson. 2017. “The Footprint of 
Energy: Land Use of US Electricity Production.” Logan. https://www.strata.org/footprints/. 
31 Maohang, Bao. 2004. “Environmental History in China.” Environment and History 10 (4): 475–99. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20723506. 
17 
 
over 1500 times in its documented history, destroying homes and taking lives in its wake.  
Therefore, the Three Gorges Dam implied control over this river to the Chinese Communist 
Party and its people.  The dam is criticized for being a symbol of totalitarian control and the 
CCP’s socio-political legitimacy rather than being praised as a hydroelectric energy project.32 
The Chinese Communist Party has historically censored the voices of intellectuals, occasionally 
through gruesome means, who speak out against the Three Gorges Dam.33  
 The Three Gorges Dam and China’s agricultural practices during the GLF and Cultural 
Revolution had adverse effects on the quality and quantity of water.  For example, China 
promoted a concept of ‘encircling lakes to build grainfields,’ which resulted in a decline in water 
availability.34  ‘Encircling lakes to build grainfields,’ also meant extracting vegetation which 
caused soil erosion into watersheds.35  Unstable water volumes in rivers can lead to functionality 
issues with hydropower dams, a common occurrence involving Maoist-Era hydropower 
facilities.  Chinese dams are often located in areas of high seismic activity, thus establishing a 
high risk for a dam failure.  In 1975, the Banqiao Dam, a Great Leap Forward hydropower 
project located in Henan, ruptured, and resulted in an estimated 85,000 casualties.  
 Many of the dam constructions amounted to little benefit for the Chinese people.  
Elizabeth Economy notes that the majority of the dams failed within approximately three years 
after their completion despite the large amount of land-use change and relocations that had been 
invested to construct them.36  Opponents to such dam projects also argue that China’s energy 
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storage system was not equipped to transport the generated power to the east coast industrial 
region, undermining the overall value of the dams.37 
  ‘Encircling lakes to build grainfields,’ was not the only contributor to water insecurity 
under Mao Zedong.  Soil erosion further contributed to dam malfunctions and flooding.38  By 
1989, 14 of the 25 major rivers in China were badly polluted due to soil erosion.39  Also, 
pesticide use was another major contributor to water pollution.  Harmful nitrates from pesticides 
leeched into groundwater and nitrate runoff into watersheds led to eutrophication, rendering the 
water useless.40  It is important to note, rather briefly, that pesticides can be highly toxic to 
humans if they are either consumed or exposed through extended activities––such as 
agriculture.41  Although Chinese farmers conducted largescale water conservation measures, the 
lack of expertise led to alkalization––water with a pH too basic for usage––and soil that became 
too saturated with water for usage.42     
Chinese Philosophy Towards Nature and Mao’s Condemnation of Scientific Thought  
  Much of the environmental damages described above are at least partially attributed to 
sociological behavior towards nature and the persecution of intellectuals.  In ancient history, two 
of the three Chinese core schools of thought––Daoism and Buddhism––promoted ‘Harmony of 
heaven and humankind,’ a philosophy of a mutual relationship between man and nature. 43  But, 
of the three schools, Confucianism seems to be the exception regarding this attitude towards 
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nature.   Confucian philosophy treats nature as an asset to be controlled rather than promoting a 
harmonious relationship between man and nature.  While Mao rejected traditional Confucian 
discourse, Mao’s Great Leap Forward policies––such as the Four Pests Campaign––paralleled 
the Confucian philosophy of anthropocentricism.   As Shapiro argues, Confucianism’s defining 
characteristic of pragmatism would better serve society if it were to adopt the Daoist sense of 
modesty and to treat humans as a part of nature rather than a superior entity.44  In Daoism, an 
appreciation for the aesthetic composition of nature was a highly engrained facet, that implied its 
absence in Chinese media and culture during the Maoist Era.45 
 Associated with the traditional Confucian principles, the suppression of intellectuals and 
scientific thought also contributed to environmental degradation.  According to Becker, science 
was not actually ‘suppressed’ by Mao, but rather reconstructed with Marxist and Maoist 
thought.46   For example, the People’s Daily once reported that grade school children were taught 
to place decimal places in the incorrect place in their arithmetic work, exemplifying how the 
CCP promoted acrimony towards fundamental scientific and mathematical theory.47  
In light of this, we can reflect that the Chinese Communist Party reframed science to its 
benefit by propagandizing it with motivational language that orients the peasants towards action.  
Besides the Four Pests Campaign, other GLF policies that convey pseudo-science include the 
agricultural techniques of close planting and deep ploughing.  Mao encouraged the peasants to 
plant grain seeds in a density as close as physically possible as doing so would, allegedly, 
maximize grain yields.  In 1959, Mao ordered the peasants to plant 12-15 million grain seeds per 
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2.5 acres, a drastic increase from the norm of 1.5 million per 2.5 acres.48  Without ample soil 
space, however, the grain cannot absorb enough nutrients, which hinders the sufficient growth of 
seeds.  Plowing the soil as deep as physically possible was believed to be an effective 
agricultural technique.  Economy describes peasants who tied ropes around their waits to dig 
thirteen-foot trenches for the purpose of planting seeds.49 
A handful of intellectuals spoke out against the Party for all the flaws they found in 
Mao’s economic policies.  For example, Huang Wanli, a Qinghua University professor, pointed 
out that designers of the Three Gorges Dam ignored the 540 million tons of silt in the river.50  
This unaccounted-for silt could collect in front of the dam which could potentially lead to 
flooding.  Huang was labeled a “Rightist,” and a “Counterrevolutionary,” by the Chinese 
Communist Party for his statements condemning the dam.  But, intellectuals who spoke out 
against Mao were few and far in-between.  Most intellectuals and critics remained silent, to keep 
themselves away from being exposed to the risk of persecution.  Furthermore, many intellectuals 
rallied behind Mao’s visionary thought, believing that Mao gave China the opportunity to return 
to its former pre-occupation glory.51  Some intellectuals, to avoid intense physical farm labor, 
became important members of Mao’s propaganda team, falsifying data of grain yields to paint a 
false picture of success during the Great Leap Forward.52  Organized propaganda worked 
surprisingly well, despite China’s immense size and population. 
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Why Propaganda? 
 Propaganda is an ingrained custom of our daily lives.  All humans communicate with 
each other, and much of that demonstratively intends to shape distinctive attitudes among others.  
People most commonly associate propaganda with half-truths and lies spread by totalitarian 
governments but, in reality, communication as persuasion is pervasive in this world.  Much of 
the existing literature that examines propaganda was conducted since the mid-20th century.  The 
totalitarian regimes––such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the PRC––relied on 
propaganda to tighten their grip of control over the masses.  Jacque Ellul’s 1962 book 
Propaganda: The Nature of Men’s Attitudes has been one of the most seminal analyses of 
propaganda so far.  The two main types of propaganda, according to Ellul, are: (i) propaganda of 
agitation and (ii) propaganda of integration.  Propaganda of agitation, which was the most 
utilized type within Maoist propaganda, was intended to instigate revolutionary action by the 
masses, while propaganda of integration sought to unite individuals into groups with the same 
ideas.53   
  Ellul argues that propaganda is a necessity, for both the state and its people.54  The state 
needs propaganda for the means of integrating individuals into a political system.  It is worth 
noting that the reliance of individuals on propaganda is often overlooked.  As Ellul mentions, 
“You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink.”55  Here, I can reflect that 
propagandees are not victims.  They crave propaganda just as much as the state does and even 
get satisfied from it.  For example, people found satisfaction in killing sparrows during the Four 
Pests Campaign.  Without propaganda, the Chinese masses would not have performed the deep 
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ploughing and backyard steel smelting that Mao envisioned.  Fortunately, many of the modes of 
mass communication since the Maoist Era remain accessible and intact in the 21st century.  
Therefore, propaganda allows us to understand more in detail about Mao’s environmental policy 
and how culturally impactful such policies were.        
 In the extensive psychological analyses of propaganda that have taken place, evaluating 
the effectiveness of such propaganda has been one of the most arduous tasks.  Researchers have 
not effectively developed a method to analyze the relationship between propaganda and the 
human psyche to answer the commonly asked question of “Did propaganda work?”  The 
Encyclopedia of Propaganda mentions the paradox of stating “Prove that it worked,” as the 
propagandist can retort with, simply, “Prove that it did not work.”56  It is important to note that I 
do not intend to evaluate the effectiveness of the environmental policy message within print and 
visual and media.  As previously mentioned, that type of analysis is not possible at this time.   
Instead, my analysis is an evaluation of the content of Mao’s environmental policy message, 
conducted by critically analyzing propaganda. 
Propaganda Usage in the Maoist Era  
 The Chinese Communist Party was very methodical with its approach towards spreading 
propaganda and its techniques of molding the ideal citizen.  In The Fine Art of Propaganda, 
Alfred McClung Lee compiled a series of propaganda techniques employed by Reverend Charles 
E. Coughlin.  One of those techniques, “card-stacking,” indicates the tendency of a propagandist 
to falsify data and statistics to paint an illusory narrative in the minds of the people.57  As such, 
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falsified statistics were one of the most widely-employed techniques by the Maoist propaganda 
system.  The People’s Daily was riddled with falsified data, but it was the only newspaper 
available to read and thus it was impossible to refute the numbers.  As Lou states in his memoir, 
“We knew that anything that appeared in Our Party’s newspaper had to be true.”58  This quote 
exemplifies that propaganda is much more effective if it does not spread known lies and relies on 
spreading spurious statements that cannot be disproven.  Adopting such techniques from the 
Soviet Union, the Party emphasized manipulating statistics.  As discussed earlier, some of the 
firmest believers in Mao Zedong and the Party were former intellectuals who would be regularly 
reading the People’s Daily.  Statistics, whether accurate or falsified, appealed to this intellectual 
demographic.  The CCP possessed total control over the distribution of newspapers, the 
personnel writing them, and any editorials that were written.59  Maintaining its confidentiality, 
the CCP’s propaganda writers used pseudonyms, beginning in the early 1960s.60  One of the 
most well-known pseudonyms used was Liang Xiao, presented as an individual’s name.  
However, as Liang Xiao has the same pronunciation as “two schools,” it exposed the 
pseudonym’s true identity as the writing team administered by China’s most prestigious 
universities: Beijing University and Qinghua University.61  The CCP reaped large benefits from 
its control over the newspaper with the political standardization of the people that occurred as a 
result.   Yet, the effects were not always positive.  As Ellul notes, an overload of information 
could work against the propagandist as the data may not be easily remembered when 
communicated in a jargonized manner.62  The esoteric jargon plagued the People’s Daily 
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newspaper and newspapers were, as Houn describes, “So dull that it has incurred a considerable 
measure of popular aversion to them.”63  
On the other hand, the “band wagon,” propaganda technique was another propaganda 
technique mentioned in Lee’s book.64  Maoist propaganda slogans frequently featured phrases 
such as: ‘Everyone is responsible for…’ (renren youze).  Such slogans emphasize unity, a 
common mission, and a notion that everyone is performing a certain activity for a particular goal.  
Humans naturally gravitate towards uniting in groups, therefore, it made sense for many of 
Mao’s followers to hop on the largest band wagon in China: The CCP’s communist ideology.           
One might argue that the vast majority of China’s population during the Great Leap 
Forward was illiterate and therefore could not read the newspaper. 65  Even for the illiterate 
demographic, however, card-stacking was still quite effective.  Falsehoods were communicated 
verbally, from party officials and from one illiterate poor citizen to another.  Lou includes a 
quote from a party secretary addressing the commune:   
In this room you can say anything.  We’re like a family.  No one’s going to report you.  But 
if someone from outside heard you, you’d be in deep trouble.  You’d be history.  They’d 
say you’re against the Great Leap Forward.  And whoever’s against the Great Leap 
Forward is against the revolution–Chairman Mao said that.  So, brother, think about it.  
Think about it.66  
It is very possible that Chairman Mao never uttered this statement.  Still, the farmers had no idea 
if he did or not.  They were all incapable of reading the newspaper.  Despite the effectiveness of 
verbal propaganda, the Chinese still made an effort to mitigate the illiteracy.  The reformation to 
the simplified Chinese character system that is currently recognized as China’s official language 
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is rooted in the 1950s movement of increasing literacy.  In turn, the number of people who could 
absorb newspaper propaganda expanded throughout the Maoist Era as the written language 
became more universal. 
 Meanwhile, the press was not the only platform that was manipulated by the CCP.  The 
entire media was completely state-run.  Even Mao’s wife, Chiang Ching, played a pivotal role in 
organized communication, by producing films and plays that contained political undertones.67  
The most noteworthy of the bunch is The Red Detachment of Women, a play about the life of a 
female military soldier during the CR.  The CCP created a robust and efficient propaganda 
department (xuanguan bu), administered by official party cadres (ganbu).68  The cadres and party 
secretaries played crucial roles in verbally administering the propaganda to the masses, 
especially in rural areas.  The cadres operated at a variety of scales and locations, some even at 
institutions of higher education, such as Qinghua University.69   Additionally, their preaching of 
CCP ideals across the mainland often exposed party critics so they could be reprimanded by the 
Party.70  Party officials who were responsible for making propaganda were called “propaganda 
soldiers.”71  Li Shaomin accounts his experience as an art soldier for the Chinese Communist 
Party during the CR.72  Just like with the newspaper, artists were tightly controlled by the 
Chinese Communist Party.  Chinese propaganda art followed a strict style of “socialist realism,” 
a technique adopted from the Soviet Union during World War II.  According to Li, the CCP 
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actually cared very little about artistic talent and skill, instead criticizing artists for political 
reasons.73  In another article, Li mentions that he was expelled from his position as an art soldier 
due to his alleged “bourgeois tendency.”74  Another academic refers to Chairman Mao’s 
propaganda as “command communication,” that effectively regurgitates as much information 
and party ideology as possible.75   People’s Daily editorial writers, for example, were evaluated 
by their ability to convey as much information as possible, rather than their personal opinions or 
writing style.  For this reason, the newspaper was frequently considered as boring and not 
widely-read by the public.        
 Similarly, the art affiliated to the socialist realism intended to efficiently communicate 
CCP ideals. The art was modest, but also eye-catching.  Unlike the newspaper, the people did not 
react to propaganda posters in the same uninterested manner.  Barbara Mittler argues in A 
Continuous Revolution: Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture that propaganda art was an 
ingrained aspect of popular culture during the Cultural Revolution and was intended to be treated 
as popular culture.76  Almost every propaganda poster featured bright and warm colors and those 
colors were quite drawing to the public.   Slogans and brief phrases were often included to 
supplement the posters and intended to instigate the masses politically.  Such posters were 
printed and distributed in large quantities to the point where the copies were more valuable than 
the original.77  While it was not necessarily worth more money, a copy of a poster could be 
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reproduced in large quantities, could be hung up anywhere, and placed in a newspaper.  Because 
so, the copy was much more valuable than the original to the Party and its people.78  The artists 
gained fame not mainly through the quality of their work, but through the number of copies 
printed.     
 The academic literature offers a few clues of a connection between propaganda and the 
environmental destruction during the Maoist Era.  A 2016 historical study analyzed the 
discussion of water issues in the People’s Daily.79  The authors found that a considerable rise in 
the number of articles discussing water issues occurred in the mid-1950s and the majority of the 
articles addressed the water conservancy crisis caused by collectivized agriculture.80  Mittler also 
argues that propaganda posters featuring Mao portrayed him as a persona of nature and a strong 
figure by placing him surrounded by rugged mountains.81  Although trace examples such as 
Mittler’s do exist in the literature, a comprehensive analysis of Maoist propaganda and 
environmental policy has not yet been conducted.   
 Therefore, I can note that the existing literature does express that environmental 
degradation occurred at a large scale under Chairman Mao.  Furthermore, propaganda, 
particularly print and visual media, was vital for Mao’s radical economic reform.  The major 
questions that I drew from my analysis of the literature are (i) what was the specific 
environmental policy message advanced by Maoist-Era print and visual media, and (ii) why 
would Mao needed an environmental policy to begin with?  What this study shows is that the 
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propaganda message conveyed in such policies is highly multifaceted.  First, Mao’s 
environmental policy played a fundamental role in the mission to establish a successful agrarian 
society that was driven by the working class.  For example, propaganda posters portrayed 
idealized societies devoid of nature which signified the success of Mao Zedong’s countryside-
based revolution.  The People’s Daily newspaper published numerous how-to guides for “deep 
ploughing,” and “close planting,” that allegedly would maximize grain output despite causing 
catastrophic soil erosion and water pollution in the process.  In that light, Mao’s environmental 
policy was one of efficiency at any cost.  The welfare of the environment was almost never 
considered, unless it served some sort of material purpose for humans.  For example, during the 
Great Leap Forward, the only CCP-driven advocacy for environmental conservation was for 
afforestation, and that was specifically for preventing soil erosion.  In the next four Chapters, I 
will be offering my contribution to the existing body of literature by connecting the dots between 
Mao’s environmental policy and propaganda.    
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Chapter 1: Utopian Urgency and Swift 
Modernization  
Misinformed Agricultural Practices to Transform Nature 
In Mao’s War Against Nature, Judith Shapiro conceptualizes what she calls “utopian 
urgency.”1  Utopian urgency refers to the CCP’s way of manipulating the nation’s economy 
towards humanly ideals.  The problem with this utopian approach to domestic China was that it 
did not consider any environmental consequences that may ensue.  The devotion to utopian 
urgency peaked during the Great Leap Forward, as the initiative sought to remodel China’s 
economic system to the gain competitiveness with Great Britain and the United States.  Chinese 
propaganda referred to this process of implementing utopian urgency as Gaizao ziran, or 
“transforming nature,” in English.  
 Prior to the GLF, in 1954, an editorial in the People’s Daily titled “Propaganda of 
Advanced Experience in Agricultural Production,” establishes the foundation for what the future 
agricultural propaganda in the People’s Daily should entail.  The article describes Gaizao ziran 
as propaganda: 
 It seems that the current task of farmers is to "fight against nature." This is propaganda 
without a line and is incapable of promoting a transformative technological revolution.2  
 
Although the author of this editorial acknowledges the term was used as propaganda, he believes 
that rhetoric alone will not lead to the agricultural revolution that Mao Zedong envisioned.  
During the GLF, the People’s Daily published educational brochures for the masses and it often 
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included farming tutorials for the uneducated.  Both scientific advancement and technological 
development played a pivotal role in utopian urgency to transform nature.  In addition, Mao was 
aware that completing the revolution without scientific advancement and technological 
innovation would be completely impossible.3         
The Chinese working class marched ahead with a wide variety of new farming principles 
to advance the Great Leap Forward’s agenda.  But, because the intellectual class was 
substantially repressed by Mao, such new procedures were highly misinformed and ineffective.  
For example, deep ploughing was a farming technique that involved ploughing the soil as deep 
as possible to incentivize proper root development.4  Easily comprehensible how-to guides for 
deep ploughing were published in the People’s Daily.5  It was supposed to improve soil quality, 
increase the resilience of the soil to drought, and to amplify fertilizer retention, though these 
beliefs were erroneous.6  The Chinese strongly believed that this technique would result in high-
yield grain seasons but deep ploughing was disastrous.  
Dense planting, or Mizhi in Chinese, was another important technique of transforming 
nature in agriculture.  Mao’s administration believed that planting the seeds in close proximity to 
one another would improve agricultural yield.  This suggests that no soil was to be wasted in the 
pursuit of maximized grain yields.7  This belief that cultivating seeds in a dense proximity would 
increase production was inherently faulty as plants always need a certain amount of space to 
gather nutrients. 
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Besides deep ploughing and close planting, the excessive use of fertilizer was another 
technique that the CCP emphasized in its agricultural how-to tutorials.  Figure 1-1, a photograph 
originally taken in 1960 a newspaper article, captured the moment of workhands conducting 
intense farming labor during the GLF.  As described by the caption, so-called “layered 
fertilizing,” was utilized in hopes of limiting pests as much as the farmers could.8  More 
specifically, the farmers in the image are adding the third layer of fertilizer on that field.9  In the 
Research Problem Overview, I discuss the copious amounts of fertilizer added by the farmers 
and the environmental costs of this excess usage.  This coupled with their inexperience with 
agriculture, we can reflect that utopian urgency drove the haphazard, ill-informed 
modernizations to maximize grain yields.   
 “Learn from Dazhai,” and Learning the Laws of Nature 
 Utopian urgency during the Great Leap Forward was hellbent on relieving the poor and 
maximizing economic outputs in response to the political turmoil the early 20th century brought 
to China.  Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolution ushered in a new phase of utopian urgency, 
integrated with a network of Mao-worshipping cults.  The Cultural Revolution united Mao’s 
socialist thought with all aspects of life – including agriculture and Gaizao ziran.  In 1963, Mao 
Zedong labeled the town of Dazhai as the Chinese Communist Party’s model for agriculture 
prowess.  Mao’s injunction to “Learn from Dazhai,” in agriculture represented a significant pivot 
in the objectives of transforming nature.  With Learn from Dazhai, Mao placed his own approval 
within the list of his agricultural goals for the peasant class.  Meaning, farming was to be 
conducted for Mao himself, as well as the public’s welfare (see chapter 3).  The utopian society 
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envisioned by the Party contained Mao’s philosophy in every household, town square, and every 
relevant activity of the peasants.   
 For this reason, Learn from Dazhai was far more than just a movement to increase 
farming yield: it was a nationwide orientation that Mao planned to respond to the regressing 
agricultural system.  The development of deeper knowledge in transforming nature for material 
gain was frequently expressed in Cultural Revolution People’s Daily editorials.10  In light of this, 
we can reflect that the rhetoric of the CR was strongly influenced by the famine and hardship 
caused by the Great Leap Forward.  Therefore, the insufficient research conducted for utopian 
urgency was critical to the devastating aftermath.  Additionally, the Cultural Revolution 
promoted reformations in agricultural science in a wide variety of propaganda forms including 
newspaper, documentary film,11 and even musical lyricism.12  The failure to effectively educate 
the working class in agricultural science during the GLF was scrutinized in newspaper 
editorials.13  For example, a 1964 newspaper article outlines an investigation into Vietnamese 
agriculture and provides insight to an example of Communist agrarian sufficiency in a country 
with similar geography and climate to China.14    
In this sense, it is useful to note, rather briefly, that Nongye xue dazhai is the Chinese 
translation of “Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture.”  The most notable word in this phrase spoken 
by Mao is xue, which means “learn,” or “study.”  Chairman Mao’s diction was not “praise,” or 
“hail,” but rather to study the success of Dazhai, and use that success as a model.  Learn from 
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Dazhai was an intellectual movement that aimed at understanding nature in order to transform it 
more swiftly, fruitfully, and efficiently.  Examples of the CCP expressing their pledge to 
understand nature, its characteristics, and the forces it governs appear in People’s Daily articles.  
In an effort to promote higher yields in sorghum––or grain––one of the editorials published in 
1966 promoted greater intellectual study of the “Laws of Nature.”15  The laws of nature or 
moqing ziran, in Chinese, is an abstract idea, but primarily refers to the goal of maximizing grain 
yield, and how agricultural science can be improved to achieve said goal.   
Farming output during the Maoist Era was fluky at best. The Chinese lacked the expertise 
to understand a trend of grain productivity that was either spontaneously increasing or drastically 
falling.16  Trial and error with farming was a commonplace, with peasants leading the charge in 
modifying farming techniques until a satisfactory harvest was achieved.17  Although the Chinese 
did want to learn more about nature, there has not been much attention regarding how they 
strived to learn more.  The uneducated farmers controlled the vast majority of farming procedure 
and agricultural reform, and their lack of education contributed in large part to the deforestation, 
biodiversity loss, and water contamination that ensued described in the Research Problem 
Overview.  To create the illusory political narrative that peasant-led farming reform was 
effective, vague language such as “large-scale mass movement to transform low yield,” was used 
in the newspaper.18  This abstracted rhetoric paired with the widespread falsification of statistical 
data constituted the widely employed and successful propaganda.  It is very probable that some 
 
15 Unknown, Author. 1966. Finding Out the Laws of Nature, Adapting to Nature and Transforming Nature. Beijing: 
People’s Daily. 
16 Ibid., 4. 
17 Xun. 1965. “The Dongzhangtun Brigade Guides its Members to Look Forward to Transforming Nature, Never 
Stop Thinking, Constantly Revolutionizing, Not Producing After Two Years of Continuous Development, More 
than 3,000 acres of Low-Lying Land Were Transformed.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
18 Li, Xuezhi. 1965. “Self-Reliance, Good and Fast Transformation of Low-Yield Fields.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
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party members caught on to the falsified grain-yield statistics in the People’s Daily, as they 
would likely not have addressed accusations of misleading data otherwise.  In contrast to the 
articles published during the GLF, the number of farming how-to tutorials were apparently few.  
Instead, the rhetoric of the CR was complimentary to Mao’s class struggle.  It promoted 
initiatives centered around the working class; and it relied on the successes of the farmers in their 
efforts to transform nature.   
Transmission Lines, Hydroelectric Dams, and Subliminal Messages of Modernity  
There are two facets of a utopian society in the eyes of the CCP: (i) a strong agricultural 
sector, and (ii) a booming industry.  To the CCP, fostering innovative energy developments 
would bring China out of the dark ages and escalate their position as a global competitor. 
Because so, propaganda posters sought to remind the Chinese populace that it was Mao who was 
responsible for the functioning lights in their homes by including subtle, and often subliminal, 
symbols of energy modernizations.  There was no extraneous feature in such propaganda print.  
If the feature did not serve a political purpose, it was not included in the poster; and if extraneous 
features were present, the artist was often ridiculed by the Party.  In my study of the propaganda, 
I discovered a few specific reoccurring features that promoted the CCP’s environmental policy 
message of anthropocentrism and utopian urgency: Transmission lines and hydroelectric dams.   
In traditional Chinese culture, nature was the vessel for aesthetics in which painters 
would escape to with the hopes of finding inspiration (see Chapter 4).  The CCP intervened that 
freedom of expression by spreading their political indoctrination, advancing these symbols of 
modernity––transmission lines and hydroelectric dans.  In the Research Problem Overview, I 
mentioned that critics of large hydroelectric projects in the Maoist Era argue that these dams 
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symbolized totalitarian control and party legitimacy, rather than as energy projects.19  The 
manner in which these dams were treated in the propaganda posters is the strongest evidence for 
this criticism.  For instance, Longtan’s New Look (Fig. 1-2) utilizes a hydroelectric dam as a 
symbol for modernity and utopia.20  The exaggerated jagged and steep geography portrayed in 
the image shows the immense amount of effort that was exerted in order to construct the small, 
but prosperous city.  The title, Longtan’s New Look, insinuates satisfaction with the new utopian 
scenery of the Longtan district and achievement by the Chinese peasants.   Additionally, 
according to Longtan’s New Look, the hydroelectric dam was not intended to be a concealed 
symbol, as the poster satisfied its original objective to exhibit the new urbanized features of 
Longtan.  However, in some cases, dams did appear subliminally.  For example, another poster 
entitled, Criticize the Reactionary Thought of Lin Biao and Confucius, Firmly Walk with the 
Workers and Peasants on the Road of Unity (Fig. 1-3), disdains reactionary ideology.21  The 
peasant in the image represents the ideal Chinese Communist Party member.  Confucius’s 
attitude towards nature was much more anthropocentric than Daoism, which viewed humans as a 
feature within nature, rather than preaching superiority.  The CCP under Mao tended to 
contradict their messages condemning Confucianism with their own practices, such as their 
inclusion of the hydroelectric dam in Figure 1-3.  The significance of this dam serves as a 
reminder to the masses that it was Chairman Mao who provided that dam and electricity to the 
people.   Ironically, Confucius would not have been completely opposed to such hydroelectric 
dams because he considered the relationship between man and nature to be subordinate to that of 
 
19 Mufson, Steven. 1997. “The Yangtze Dam: Feat or Folly?” The Washington Post Company. 1997. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/yangtze/yangtze.htm. 
20 Xu, Jialin. 1972. “Longtan’s New Look.” Ningxia: Ningxia People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1972-001. 
21 Che, Yongren, and Huali Yu. 1974. “Criticize the Reactionary Thought of Lin Biao and Confucius, Firmly Walk 
with the Workers and Peasants on the Road of Unity.” Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e13-851. 
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between men.  The masses were largely uneducated, of course, so that many had never read 
Confucius.  Therefore, they could never realize that Chairman Mao was actually supporting 
Confucianism while simultaneously contradicting himself.  Mittler mentions in her book that 
some of the peasants were exposed to Confucian writings for the first time during the Cultural 
Revolution; and several of them thought that he was actually not such an incomprehensible 
guy.22 
In addition to such hydroelectric dams, the Chinese also had a unique fascination for 
transmission lines and towers as symbols of modernity and the superiority of man, as evidenced 
by their large presence in the propaganda posters.  The placement of these structures in rural 
areas alludes to transforming nature and their height signifies towering over nature.  These 
transmission towers frequently appear in an image completely outside of context.   For example, 
Go to the Country Side to Serve 500 million Peasants (Fig. 1-4), an image of a Chinese 
Communist Party health worker, contains almost no background.23  The only visible feature 
besides the health worker is the transmission tower on his left.  The transmission tower could 
have been omitted from the image and it has negligible presence to the overarching message of 
the propaganda poster.  Although the transmission tower in Go to the Country Side to Serve 500 
million Peasants is unrelated to Chairman’s Mao’s environmental policy and transforming 
nature, the image clearly exemplifies the political purpose of placing transmission towers in 
Mao’s propaganda.   
 
22 Mittler, Barbara. 2016. A Continuous Revolution: Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Asia Center. 
23 Lin, Rixiong. 1965. “Go to the Countryside to Serve the 500 Million Peasants.” Hebei: Hebei People’s Fine Arts 
Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1965-030. 
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Then again, some utility towers in Chinese propaganda posters are more elusive.  The 
posters found in Stefan Landsberger’s online poster archive are riddled with such structures.  In 
Figure 1-6, an image entitled, Become a Red Seedling, the transmission lines again appear––this 
time without the tower itself––and are soaring above the peasant girl at the front of the image.24  
The girl’s eyes are facing parallel to the power lines, expressing attention towards future 
progress and the ensuing utopian world.   
Similarly, Longtan’s New Look (Fig. 1-2) displays the transmission tower within a 
landscape and places it at the forefront of the image.  More specifically, it resides at the top of a 
steep, narrow mountain; and leaves the viewer marveling at how it was constructed in such a 
challenging location.  In this case, the tower symbolizes transforming nature and creating a 
utopia for the good of the CCP.  Visualizing the electrical connection and urbanization within 
rural areas, the power lines are linked between the mountain tower to the village below.  The 
miniscule figures of workers surrounding the structure make the utility tower’s exaggerated vista 
to be visualized in an even wider scale.   
In an image promoting birth control (Fig. 1-5), the transmission tower again appears, in 
this case, towering over a forest.25  Unlike Longtan’s New Look, the transmission tower in this 
image is unrelated to the primary message of the poster.  However, its role is equally as 
important.  The forest is described as the most inferior feature in the hierarchy that the image 
signifies: it resides beneath both the humans and the transmission tower.  The utility tower at its 
core symbolizes progress and modernity.  Such posters that depicted a small city within a rural 
 
24 Ha, Qiongwen. 1965. “Become a Red Seedling.” Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e12-474. 
25 Designer, Unknown. n.d. “Practicing Birth Control Is Beneficial for the Protection of the Health of Mother and 
Child.” Publisher Unknown. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-717. 
38 
 
area of a metropolitan were indeed common.  However, because the Party was uniquely 
fascinated with transmission towers, propaganda artists would include them in landscapes in lieu 
of a city if they wanted to.  The transmission towers were, therefore, not only chosen for their 
simplicity to paint, but also because of their height and position on top of treacherous geography.  
As their height and location symbolize conquering and soaring above nature, they were better 
signifiers than a city for making political implications.  Therefore, presenting these transmission 
towers as such subtly indicates that their purpose extended beyond promoting the environmental 
policy.  Environmental policy also fit within the broader goals of the CCP to exert control over 
the masses.  The repetitive usage of these transmission towers, therefore, suggests that it 
contributed to manipulating the masses to maintain their support of the one-party system. 
Pigs, Tractors, and Speeding Up Agriculture 
 Within the large scope of utopian urgency, technological innovations, especially in 
agriculture, played an instrumental role.  Tractors, for example, were believed to increase grain 
output at an alarming rate.  Chairman Mao believed in industrialized-intensive agriculture; that is 
often referred nowadays as factory farming.  This type of intensive agriculture frequently 
disregards ethical treatment of livestock as well as the environment.  This style of intensive 
animal agriculture was a commonplace throughout the world at the time, but the Maoist-Era CCP 
was an especially large promoter of industrialized agriculture.  For example, the phrase, “huafei 
chang,” or “fertilizer factory,” is used to describe a pig within a 1959 propaganda poster (Fig. 1-
7).26  Referring to a pig as a “fertilizer factory,” implies the lack of humane treatments towards it 
and the anthropocentric view that considers it entirely as an expendable asset.  Treating pigs as 
 
26 Ben, Shi. 1959. “Pigs Are Fertilizer Factories as Well as Treasure Bowls.” Shanghai: shanghai people’s fine arts 
publishing house. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1959-002. 
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factories for fertilizer partially explains how excessive the fertilizer usage was in Communist 
China.  The background of Figure 1-7 is, not a painting, but a photograph of a series of pigs 
within highly confined pens, a common characteristic of intensive animal agriculture.   
 The livestock are even more confined within their pens in Figure 1-8 entitled 
Energetically Develop Pig Farming, though this image was published far later, in 1977. The 
image exemplifies that the authoritarian agricultural system was pervasive even after Mao’s 
death.27  The woman jubilantly driving a tractor commonly appeared in Maoist-Era posters and 
was also associated with modernity and gender equality.  This kind of posters portraying 
liberated women operating heavy machinery influenced a bin of posters called “Tractor Girls,” in 
Stefan Landsberger’s extensive online archive.28  Tractors were far more than a farming 
technological advancement; they were valorized as a political symbol.  In addition to the 
transmission towers, such symbolizations of the tractors intended to legitimize the CCP and 
reminded the populace of Mao’s illusory achievement in technological advancement and 
economic stability.  The tractor was even idolized to the extent where Mao Zedong eventually 
believed that China needed an unwarranted army of tractors.  Speed Up the Mechanization of 
Agriculture (Fig. 1-9), contains a parade of farming machines, oriented in a similar fashion and 
demeanor to a military parade.29  In this image, the tractors are organized in rows similar to 
soldiers in a war, embarking on the fight to transform land.  I will dig deeper into this topic in 
Chapter 2.                 
 
27 Ye, Wulin. 1977. “Energetically Develop Pig Farming.” People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-967. 
28 Landsberger, Stefan. n.d. “Tractor Girls.” Chineseposters.Net. https://chineseposters.net/themes/tractor-girls. 
29 Unknown, Designer. 1960. “Speed up the Mechanization of Agriculture.” Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Fine Arts 
Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/d25-137. 
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Chapter 1 Images 
Figure 1-1: People’s Database Information. 1960. “Plant Wheat Well in Accordance with the 
Spirit of the ‘Eight-Character Constitution’.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-2:  Xu, Jialin. 1972. “Longtan’s New Look.” Ningxia: Ningxia People’s Fine Arts 
Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1972-001. 
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Figure 1-3:  Che, Yongren, and Huali Yu. 1974. “Criticize the Reactionary Thought of Lin Biao 
and Confucius, Firmly Walk with the Workers and Peasants on the Road of Unity.” Tianjin: 
Tianjin People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e13-851. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-4: Lin, Rixiong. 1965. “Go to the Countryside to Serve the 500 Million Peasants.” 
Hebei: Hebei People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1965-
030 
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Figure 1-5:  Designer, Unknown. n.d. “Practicing Birth Control Is Beneficial for the Protection 
of the Health of Mother and Child.” Publisher Unknown. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-
717. 
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Figure 1-6:  Ha, Qiongwen. 1965. “Become a Red Seedling.” Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Fine 
Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e12-474. 
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Figure 1-7: Ben, Shi. 1959. “Pigs Are Fertilizer Factories as Well as Treasure Bowls.” 
Shanghai: shanghai people’s fine arts publishing house. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-
1959-002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-8:  Ye, Wulin. 1977. “Energetically Develop Pig Farming.” People’s Fine Arts 
Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-967 
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Figure 1-9: Unknown, Designer. 1960. “Speed up the Mechanization of Agriculture.” Shanghai: 
Shanghai People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/d25-137. 
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Chapter 2: Moving Mountains and 
Taking Control of Feral Land 
The Man Versus Nature Conflict 
In the previous chapter, I outlined how transforming nature through utopian urgency 
farming procedures aimed to maximize China’s farming yield, regardless of the environmental 
consequences.  Although maximizing efficiency of farming yield was a prevailing strategy, there 
are additional components of transforming nature.  China is located in a region that historically 
has been susceptible to deadly landslides, earthquakes, and floods.1  One of China’s two longest 
rivers, the Yellow River, is nicknamed “The Great Sorrow,” because of its tendency to flood 
regularly and cause devastation.  In the eyes of many Chinese, the river has, not only flooded 
crop fields, but also claimed the lives of the poor rural farmers that Mao’s communist revolution 
was built upon.    
In light of this, conquering nature was not only about feeding China’s starving 
population, it was also about building a subsistence-based society, in spite of the obstacles faced 
by the peasants.  As Ruth Rogaski argues, the copious amount of fertilizer that was used during 
this era was reminiscent of China’s Patriotic Health Campaign, a 1952 initiative that sought to 
mitigate China’s poor sanitation and disease-ridden nation.2  The Patriotic Health Campaign 
meshed comfortably with the political popularity of Mao’s Four Pest’s Campaign as controlling 
 
1 Han, Weixiao, Chen Liang, Baofa Jiang, Wei Ma, and Ying Zhang. 2016. “Major Natural Disasters in China, 
1985-2014: Occurrence and Damages.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 13 
(11): 1118. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph13111118. 
2 Rogaski, R. (2002). Nature, Annihilation, and Modernity: China’s Korean War Germ-Warfare Experience 
Reconsidered. Association for Asian Studies, 61(2), 381–415. 
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pests and insects that bring disease and hinder crop development was a crucial component of 
transforming nature.    
Numerous articles in the People’s Daily that account the endeavors of peasants 
contextualize this conflict between the Chinese masses and natural disasters which exemplify the 
dichotomy of men versus nature.  In 1957, one year prior to the Great Leap Forward, the CCP 
announced that China’s field of meteorology should adopt a greater emphasis on improving 
agriculture.  More specifically, the sole purpose of meteorology was to better prepare for and, 
ideally, prevent future natural disasters.3  While the particular role of meteorologists is portrayed 
relatively vague in the newspaper, there is some evidence that advisory stations were set up to 
educate the farmers regarding weather and climate.4  Preventing drought and flood was a 
specialized job in some locations, as depicted in Figure 2-1, the image of workers aiding farmers 
in preventing drought.5  The caption describes the laborers as “soldiers,” as if they are armed 
forces in a war.6  In this case, these soldiers are fighting against the forces of nature rather than 
human forces.  Thus, natural disasters have been described as enemy diseases that needed to be 
“cured,” that is, to be accomplished by everyone uniformly acting as soldiers against disease.7               
Similarly, Figure 2-2 portrays a large and burly worker pushing two stones away from 
each other, intending to express control over nature.8  For years, the Chinese felt as if they were 
slaves of the natural world.  With Mao’s revolution, they would be freed from the dominant 
power of nature, as long as they followed the example of the burly worker from Figure 2-2.  
 
3 Unknown, Author. 1957. “Improve Work Quality, Reduce Disasters and Increase Happiness for Everyone Deng at 
the National Association of Advanced Meteorologists.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
4 Ibid., 4.  
5 Zhang, Shixun. 1959. “Conquer Natural Disasters with the Power to Fight the Enemy.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
6 Ibid., 7. 
7 Ming, Yu. 1958. “Huaibei Journey.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
8 Liao, Luyan. 1959. “The Mission of the Agricultural Front in 1959.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
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To inspire the peasants to act like this burly soldier and persevere through harsh weather 
conditions, the CCP used propaganda.  Chinese propaganda does not distance humans from 
nature but instead forms a tightly knit bond between the two.  For Maoist China, nature was an 
obstacle that must be overcome, it was not something that was simply adapted to.   As such, if a 
Maoist-Era poster depicted a natural landscape in a realistic manner, it was often to highlight the 
harshness of nature.  Prior to the later years of the CR, very little artistic attention was paid to 
portraying the natural beauty of the environment.  Much of the images that depicted nature in a 
realistic form were images of soldiers braving through the harsh elements during times of war.  
For example, The Cavalry in Wind and Snow (Fig. 2-3) depicts two cavalry soldiers in wooly 
overcoats who ride through China’s snowy landscape.9  Their stern expressions bring out their 
focus on achieving the end goal of a CCP victory.  Particular detail in this print was paid towards 
the snow on the ground and the snow stuck to the tree branches.  This type of emphasis is very 
uncharacteristic of Chinese propaganda posters as natural environments often appeared simple 
and lacking of precise detail.  Mao believed that portraying the environment in a realistic fashion 
was frivolous, unless doing so was needed for political indoctrination.  A similar image, titled An 
Arduous Journey (Fig. 2-4) shows soldiers marching through difficult terrain represented by 
steep crags and thick forests.10  Part of the image depicts infantry men scaling one of these crags 
with a single rope.  The scene displayed in An Arduous Journey is undoubtedly exaggerated to 
express the man vs. nature conflict.   
If we revert back to China’s tumultuous history with floods and their ramifications, it 
suggests that the Chinese possessed bitterness towards flooding and uncontrolled water.  Brave 
 
9 Zhang, Biwu. 1966. “The Cavalry in Wind and Snow.” Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e13-849. 
10 Ying, Yeping, and Huaqing Wang. 1961. “An Arduous Journey Scroll (Seven). Lazikou.” Shanghai: Shanghai 
People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1961-012. 
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the Wind and the Waves, Everything has Remarkable Abilities (Fig. 2-5) portrays a group of 
peasants that cleave the waves of the ocean.11  Here, the water itself serves the purpose of 
highlighting the strength and resilience of the peasant class.  However, the image also insinuates 
that nature must be controlled to orient China to economic progress and modernity.  The peasants 
resisting the tides of the ocean imply that the revolution is unstoppable.  Another image, Our 
Great Teacher (Fig. 2-6), illustrates a jovial, young male teacher carrying a child across a 
rushing stream while other excited children look on.12  This print represents the 1960s campaign 
that mobilized young children into rural areas for schooling.  The scene intends to elevate the 
power and strength of the working class while simultaneously acknowledging the onerous 
journey of traveling through rural China on foot.   
Overall, the images presented in this section portray a strong feeling of the man versus 
nature conflict.  In this sense, such propaganda posters portraying human figures are intended to 
display the ideal communist revolutionary.  Every feature of a Chinese propaganda poster is 
politically motivated, including the background landscape and its features.  All of the images 
presented in this subsection are of a communist party member overcoming nature is some way 
shape or form, which made them, in the eyes of Chairman Mao and the CCP, an ideal member of 
the Chinese Communist Party.      
Moving Mountains to Win the Man Versus Nature Conflict  
Another dimension of the man versus nature conflict exemplified by the articles in the 
People’s Daily is the transformation of large and seemingly unusable land masses into arable 
 
11 Wang, Liuying, Liliang Xin, Muyi Meng, Jinping Xu, Biwu Zhang, Shaoyun Wu, Zhaofang Jin, Weibo Yu, and 
Zezhi Lu. 1958. “Brave the Wind and the Waves, Everything Has Remarkable Abilities.” Shanghai: Shanghai 
People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1958-024. 
12 Xin, Liliang. 1965. “Our Great Teacher.” Shanghai: shanghai people’s fine arts publishing house. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1965-002. 
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land for agriculture.  Barren land, like natural disasters, was viewed by the CCP as an enemy of 
the Chinese populace: 
You can see the rolling hills, barren land, wind and drought.  The frequent natural 
conditions in Pingtan Country are so bad, but the unity yield of their early rice increased 
by 57 percent, when natural conditions improved.13 
 
As the rhetoric in the above article indicates how the Chinese treated rolling hills and barren land 
as equally undesirable as drought, barren land did not satisfy the expectation of the CCP to 
maximize efficiency of the land masses.  Mao’s CCP wanted to set an exemplary model for all of 
the Chinese people.  Transforming nature––regardless of physical risk, feasibility, or education 
level––was undoubtedly possible to complete as no task has been too great for the citizens of 
China, even if the duty involved transforming deserts into fertile land.  
New Masters of the Reclaimed Wasteland (Fig. 2-7), a poster published in 1964, shows 
an enthusiastic group of peasants in a rural landscape clutching mining tools.14  In the 
background, a larger group of peasants is working to mine away at a mountain.  The landscape is 
yet to be fully transformed given the presence of the mountain and the large number of trees in 
the area.  However, the title of this poster mentions that the land in its current state is 
“wasteland,” and the peasants are in the process of performing a makeover on the land.  There is 
a section of the land that has already been converted into a grain field which suggests that the 
peasants have made significant progress.  The atmosphere shows that there is still much work to 
be done to ensure total control, however, as the faces of the peasants in the foreground exhibit 
the vision for the future.          
 
13 Unknown, Author. 1959. “Attach Great Importance to the Great Role of the People.” Beijing: Fujian Daily News. 
14 Yao, Zhongyu. 1964. “New Masters of the Reclaimed Wasteland.” Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Fine Arts 
Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-695. 
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In light of this, China’s mountainous geography presented an arduous task of ensuring 
land-use was efficient and adequately tailored for agriculture.  Converting the mountainous 
wasteland into grain fields and digging irrigation channels on mountains was highly perilous and 
exhausting work for the farmers.  An example of what these terraces looked like can be found in 
Figure 2-8.15  The caption of this image claims that 92 percent of the 800 acres of land that was 
converted into terraces in Guizhou province can now be irrigated.  There was a belief that the 
Chinese farmers were capable of artificially melting snow for agriculture.16  This practice of 
transforming mountains into terraces for agriculture, is often called “moving mountains” in 
Maoist-Era primary sources.  This notion that the Chinese laborers could physically “move 
mountains,” for agriculture originated in an old folk tale called Yu Gong Yi Shan––The Foolish 
Old Man Moved the Mountains.  The story tells of an old man who single-handedly stripped 
down two mountains that obstructed his view bucket by bucket.  The exact number of times this 
story was repeated during the Maoist Era is immeasurable, though it was first brought up by Mao 
in one of his many speeches.  In other words, as an integral aspect of Mao’s propaganda 
campaign, the slogans and stories of Chinese peasants transforming mountains allude Yu Gong Yi 
Shan.  While the idea of moving mountains was inspired by a myth, the People’s Daily and the 
propaganda posters played a seminal role in convincing the Chinese that transforming nature was 
no mere folk tale.  For example, “bald mountains turn into green hills,”17 “I pushed the three 
mountains above my head,”18 and “Look at the mountains, dress them up beautifully,”19 were 
slogans that appeared in the newspaper.     
 
15Cao, Zheng. 1958. “Let Water Serve Agricultural Production Better.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
16 Li, Bingshu. 1960. “Geography Should Serve Agricultural Production.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
17 Li, 1960, Geography Should Serve Agricultural Production, 7. 
18 Hai, Leng. 1959. “600 Million People Build the Motherland Garden.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
19 Luo, Wencai. 1958. “Ask for Food from Barren Hills and Mountains.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
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In addition, moving mountains was a revolutionary idea that extended beyond 
agriculture.  For instance, industrial reforms, particularly in China’s rudimentary rail system, 
were accomplished through moving mountains.  The archaic Baocheng Railway was revamped 
in 1958.  20 percent of the route passes through hills and plains, while the rest travels through 
treacherous land encompassed by mountains, canyons, and cliffs.20  Tie long, that is, “Iron 
Dragon,” in English, is how Shao and Jiang call the train in their newspaper editorial.  The 
editorial, “Iron Dragon Flying Over Thousands of Waters and Mountains,” emphasizes the 
propaganda ideas of modernity and transforming nature in its content.  “Let the mountains down 
and the rivers give way,” the newspaper article states, emphasizing the enslavement of nature by 
China’s Baocheng Railroad.21  The negative relationship between the Baocheng Railroad and the 
surrounding landscape is effectively summarized in the following quote: 
[The Train] is also like a giant of steel, stepping on the sinister Qinling Mountains, 
embracing the rich Qinchuan and Western Sichuan plain.22 
 
The adjectives in this quote differentiate plains and mountains as forces of good and evil.  The 
train steps on the sinister mountains while embracing the richness of the plains. 
The Prize for Winning the Man Versus Nature Conflict 
The Chinese propaganda mission also frequently used idealized landscapes as models to 
represent the destination of the man versus nature conflict.  The village of Dazhai, which Mao 
labeled as a model for agricultural advancement during the Cultural Revolution, was frequently 
exhibited in an idealized fashion.  The most apparent example of a Cultural Revolution 
 
20 Xiong, Yuzhong. 1958. “We Repaired the Difficult Baocheng Railway.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
21 Shao, Tingjun, and Qisheng Jiang. 1959. “Iron Dragon Flying over Thousands of Waters and Mountains.” 
Beijing: People’s Daily. 
22 Ibid. 
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propaganda poster that exemplifies this would be Dazhai (Fig. 2-9).23  There are vibrant images 
and symbols of liveliness in Dazhai.  For example, there are painterly components that describe a 
utopian society––such as, cherry blossoms, the perfectly symmetrical terraces, and the red-roofed 
buildings.  The only trees present in the image could be found in the city region, signifying that 
they were not naturally growing trees, but trees planted by the farmers.  The mountains in the 
background are completely devoid of trees insinuating that they were all cut down to build 
farming terraces.  Dazhai was undoubtedly an exaggerated and unrealistic depiction of both a 
society and a landscape.  Such idealized societies were also portrayed in earlier posters from the 
Great Leap Forward, such as The People's Communes are Good (Fig. 2-10).24  The ideal 
commune functions as a well-oiled machine with each feature playing its part for Mao’s 
revolution.  The commune is well-organized and prosperous with its flourishing grain fields, 
lively city area, and the backyard furnace located on the right-hand side.  Again, the only 
realistic component that visualizes nature and society is reserved to the very rear of the image, 
which symbolizes the unfinished journey to transform nature. 
Dazhai was Mao’s Cultural Revolution model for agriculture, but Daqing was Mao’s 
model for industry.  In his 1975 image called In Industry, Learn from Daqing (Fig. 2-11), Song 
Wenzhi places towering industrial buildings that really draw the attention of the viewer.25  The 
red billowing smoke is the most vibrant feature of the image signifying economic progress and 
China’s industrial utopia.    
 
23 Unknown, Author. n.d. “Dazhai.” University of Westminster Chinese Poster Collection. https://library-artstor-
org.ezproxy.uvm.edu/#/asset/AAPDIG_10312354166. 
24 Rui, Guangting. 1958. “The People’s Communes Are Good.” Shanghai: Shanghai Educational Publishing House. 
http://www.iisg.nl/exhibitions/affiche/met/g01-959.jpg. 
25 Song, Wenzhi. 1975. “In Industry, Study Daqing.” Jiangsu: University of Westminster Chinese Poster Collection. 
https://library-artstor-org.ezproxy.uvm.edu/#/asset/AAPDIG_10312352072. 
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This Maoist impulse of total control over nature and idealized landscapes pervaded in the 
other subliminal messages in propaganda posters.  For example, a poster entitled Marrying Late 
has Many Advantages (Fig. 2-12), has a core message of deemphasizing marriage and having 
children in favor of focusing on revolutionary responsibilities.26  This focus of the image regards 
the two peasants, the male farmer, and the female agricultural scientist, working together to 
improve China’s grain yields for all.  However, the background of the image and its features are 
also noteworthy in the sense of the Maoist impulse.  The background portrays an idealized 
landscape with prosperous grain fields, a vibrant industrial sector, and organized mountainside 
terraces.  The greenery in the image is sparse with only a few small shrubs.  The background of 
the image shows the viewer the end result of the work conducted by the two revolutionaries in 
the image: a landscape scarcely inhabited with life.  Figure 2-13, Develop the Basket on the 
Back Spirit, Serve the People Wholeheartedly, conveys its message in an almost identical 
manner.27  The ‘Basket on the Back Spirit’ is the philosophy of the ideal CCP member, and 
conveying said philosophy is the primary intent of the poster.  However, the background of this 
image also contextualizes an idealized agricultural scene without any trees, birds, or waterfalls.  
The only body of water is a calmly flowing stream, implying its optimization for irrigation and 
limited threat of water damage.     
Besides Dazhai (Fig. 2-9), the images explored in this subsection have the same theme 
that consists of both the journey and the ultimate aims of Mao Zedong’s revolution.  The peasant 
farmers with their working-class demeanor represent the former.  The landscapes, on the 
contrary, represent the latter.  Ultimately, the final destination in the eyes of the CCP, was, 
 
26Unknown, Designer. n.d. “Marrying Late Has Many Advantages.” Unknown Publisher. 
https://chineseposters.net/sites/default/files/2020-06/e15-716.jpg.  
27 Liang, Yunqing. 1960. “Develop the Basket on the Back Spirit, Serve the People Wholeheartedly.” People’s fine 
arts publishing house. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1966-007. 
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therefore, a landscape that minimized natural land that did not serve the revolution.  As a result, 
the appreciation for the natural aspects of the environment was very limited. 
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Chapter 2 Images 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1:  Zhang, Shixun. 1959. “Conquer Natural Disasters with the Power to Fight the 
Enemy.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2:  Liao, Luyan. 1959. “The Mission of the Agricultural Front in 1959.” Beijing: 
People’s Daily. 
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Figure 2-3:  Zhang, Biwu. 1966. “The Cavalry in Wind and Snow.” Shanghai: Shanghai 
People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e13-849. 
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Figure 2-4:  Ying, Yeping, and Huaqing Wang. 1961. “An Arduous Journey Scroll (Seven). 
Lazikou.” Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1961-012. 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5:  Wang, Liuying, Liliang Xin, Muyi Meng, Jinping Xu, Biwu Zhang, Shaoyun Wu, 
Zhaofang Jin, Weibo Yu, and Zezhi Lu. 1958. “Brave the Wind and the Waves, Everything Has 
Remarkable Abilities.” Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1958-024. 
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Figure 2-6:  Xin, Liliang. 1965. “Our Great Teacher.” Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Fine Arts 
Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1965-002. 
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Figure 2-7:  Yao, Zhongyu. 1964. “New Masters of the Reclaimed Wasteland.” Shanghai: 
Shanghai People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-695. 
 
Figure 2-8: Cao, Zheng. 1958. “Let Water Serve Agricultural Production Better.” Beijing: 
People’s Daily. 
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Figure 2-9: Unknown, Author. n.d. “Dazhai.” University of Westminster Chinese Poster 
Collection. https://library-artstor-org.ezproxy.uvm.edu/#/asset/AAPDIG_10312354166. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-10:  Rui, Guangting. 1958. “The People’s Communes Are Good.” Shanghai: Shanghai 
Educational Publishing House. http://www.iisg.nl/exhibitions/affiche/met/g01-959.jpg. 
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Figure 2-11:  Song, Wenzhi. 1975. “In Industry, Study Daqing.” Jiangsu: University of 
Westminster Chinese Poster Collection. https://library-artstor-
org.ezproxy.uvm.edu/#/asset/AAPDIG_10312352072. 
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Figure 2-12:  Unknown, Designer. n.d. “Marrying Late Has Many Advantages.” Unknown 
Publisher. https://chineseposters.net/sites/default/files/2020-06/e15-716.jpg. 
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Figure 2-13: Liang, Yunqing. 1960. “Develop the Basket on the Back Spirit, Serve the People 
Wholeheartedly.” People’s fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-
1966-007. 
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Chapter 3: Mao Zedong and his 
Philosophy as Nature’s Deity 
Mao’s Socialist Thought and Transforming Nature in the Cultural Revolution 
 During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong’s socialist thought was integrated into the 
CCP’s environmental policy message, driven by the Mao personality cult that emerged at the 
same time.  In his 2011 book, The Mao Cult, Daniel Leese delves into how the worshipping of 
Mao Zedong became a widespread personality cult, with the masses conducting daily rituals––
such as worship, study, calisthenics, and dance––to revere Mao and his socialist thought.  In turn, 
the frequency of the phrase “Loyalty to Chairman Mao,” drastically increased in the People’s 
Daily from 1963 to 1966.1  Mao Zedong’s philosophy became an aspect of all phases of 
everyday life for the Chinese people, including the mission to transform nature.  Two quotes 
included on page 184 of Leese’s book illuminate the comparisons made between Mao’s thought 
and the forces of nature:2 
1. A shaking earth and tumbling mountains are unable to shake the boundless 
loyalty of every red heart to you. 
 
2. The unrestrained sea and the empty sky are not enough to contain our boundless 
belief in you. (184) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, A large component of transforming nature and the propaganda 
that promoted it involved preventing the natural disasters that had plagued the mainland for so 
long.  The more powerful the negative consequences of natural disasters were, the more 
Chairman Mao became willing to possess the power and resurge to resist them.  In essence, 
 
1 Leese, Daniel. 2011. The Mao Cult. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
2 Ibid., 17. 
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Mao’s belief was that as long as the Chinese working class employed Mao Zedong thought, they 
would be able to keep minimizing the negative consequences of natural disasters, drought, and 
poor-agricultural yield.  
In my analysis of the People’s Daily, I was able to find articles that converged Mao 
Zedong’s socialist thought with the concept of transforming nature.  For example, reporter Yi 
Xiang applies Mao’s revolutionary thought to overcoming the fears of failure transforming 
nature.3  This philosophy of breaking free from the enslavement and fear of nature is reoccurring 
in the newspaper.  It was not the natural disasters that were blamed for low grain yields, it was 
fear of said natural disasters that intervened the productivity of the labor force.4  GLF 
propaganda accused the natural disasters as being the primary inhibitor to prosperous agriculture, 
so such examples are important to distinguishing the GLF propaganda and that of the Cultural 
Revolution.  In other words, Mao’s enemy shifted from nature itself to the individuals who 
enabled nature.  
While there does seem to be a correlation between Mao Zedong thought and transforming 
nature, determining the application of Mao Zedong thought is somewhat indefinite.  The articles 
suggest that Mao Zedong thought was applied to farming practices in the struggle against nature 
but I could not effectively what changes were implemented.5  But, I did notice that the CCP 
emphasized studying the story of The Foolish Old Man-Yugong Yishan and its politics during the 
Cultural Revolution to a larger degree.  In 1962, Wang Che published a musical number adopted 
from Yugong Yishan in the People’s Daily.6  The lyrics of the song are organized in 
 
3 Yi, Xiang. 1964. “Dare to Revolution and Practice.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
4 Lin, Lin, and Fengshan Yang. 1966. “Arm the Masses with Mao Zedong Thought to Promote the Great Leap in 
Production.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
5 Ibid., 2. 
6 Wang, Che. 1962. “The Foolish Old Man Moves the Mountains(Chorus).” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
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chronological order and lack musical aesthetics.  This expulsion of musical components 
exemplifies that the socialist undertones were preferably more important than developing catchy 
and repetitive phrases for the tune.  Strengthening socialism meshed comfortably with Mao’s 
plan to “move mountains.”   People’s Daily articles published during the Cultural Revolution 
take a more aggressive stance towards mountains.  For example, rhetoric such as “cutting 
mountains,” and “splitting mountains,” was used in the articles, rather than, simply, 
“transforming mountains.” 7,8  The goal of such rhetorical phrases was to imitate The Foolish Old 
Man by aiming to completely level mountains to create grain fields.  An example of what this 
process looked like can be found in Figure 3-1, which portrays numerous Chinese farmers using 
picks to chip away at a mountain.9  The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains was also 
relevant to Mao’s primary goals to maintain control over the working class and prevent a 
rebellion.  For example, in 1966, Mao took a dip in the Yangtze River to silence the critics who 
were dubious about Mao’s age and physical health.  In what is one of the most infamous political 
stunts of his tenure, Mao publicly showed that, even in old age, one could remain vigilant and 
strong as is the Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains.10  It was no coincidence that 
Mao chose the Yangtze River for this political stunt; the Yangtze River is well-known for its 
notorious floods and the ensuing bitter hardship and casualties it caused.  Therefore, we can 
reflect that Mao’s performance symbolized fearlessness of an old man in conquering nature.   
 
7 Hong, Tao, and Youqin, Ye. 1965. “Long Live Self Reliance!” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
8 Unknown, Author. 1970. “The Arid and Poor Hillside Turned into a Productive ‘Dazhaitian’ Ditches Fill Trenches 
to Create Land, Gaining Grain Production and Increasing Production Year after Year.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
9Ibid., 19. 
10 Heaver, Stuart. 2016. “Chairman Mao’s Historic Swim – Glorified in China but Ridiculed by the Rest of the 
World.” Post Magazine. https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/1999098/chairman-
maos-historic-swim-glorified-china 
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Cultural Revolution propaganda suggests that the CCP possessed an anthropocentric 
attitude towards nature, meaning that humans were considered superior to the natural world and 
its inhabitants.  There is some evidence that this attitude was adopted from Soviet philosophy, 
especially from Friedrich Engels.  According to one article titled “A Minor Correction,” Engels 
argued that animals passively adapt to nature while humans actively transform it.11  In other 
words, animals acclimate to the natural changes, whereas humans are more deliberate in their 
approach towards their surrounding environment.  Mao believed that humans possessed a ‘zijue 
de nongdongxing,’ that is ‘Conscious Initiative,’ in their actions.12  One reason why Mao 
oppressed the intellectuals and specialists was that these individuals were ‘thinkers,’ and thinkers 
are only capable of acting subjectively in Mao’s eyes.  Mao favored action rather than thinking 
because action resulted in objective change––such as higher grain yields and smelted steel.  The 
author of “A Minor Correction,” mainly evaluates the capability of humans in transforming 
nature rather than whether or not humans should do it.  However, the tone reads as if the author 
believes that anthropocentric change is instinctual for homo sapiens, which is a controversial 
idea.   
New-found Criticism of Those Who Threatened the Transformation of Nature 
In the Cultural Revolution, Mao also strategized propaganda as a method to criticize his 
political opponents who threatened the environmental policies and the transformation of nature.  
Following the disastrous Great Leap Forward, the CCP began to divide internally, and the more 
moderate wing of officials began to gain traction.  This internal division led to the production of 
propaganda that condemned native Chinese who either doubted the revolution or those who 
 
11 Ruo, Shui. 1963. “A Minor Correction.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
12 Ibid., 19. 
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resisted the mission of transforming nature.13  If we revert back to the poster entitled Criticize the 
Reactionary Thought of Lin Biao and Confucius, Firmly Walk with the Workers and Peasants on 
the Road of Unity (Fig 3-2), as indicated by the title, it intended to criticize enemies of the 
Party.14  The peasant in the image represents the ideal revolutionary who worked tirelessly to 
transform the background landscape into a prosperous utopian land.  Mao’s ousted advisor, Lin 
Biao, is displayed as the enemy of Mao’s environmental policy in this image.  The People’s 
Daily was also used to criticize those who threatened Mao’s environmental policy mission.  One 
such article condemns any individual who considered Dazhai to be fallacious.15  Chen Yonggui’s 
article also shows that the farmers with low morale following the GLF were highly scrutinized as 
doubters of transforming nature: 
Some comrades lack the Confidence, thinking that low-yield fields are backward and    
unchangeable.16 
 
This quote exemplifies the tighter relationship between criticism of counter-revolutionaries and 
the effort to transform nature shaped by Mao and his political opponents.  In this sense, the lack 
of strong Party leadership contributed to doubt of Mao’s ambitious policies to transform nature.  
The extensive use of trial and error by the inexperienced farmers led to drought and 
deforestation.  In turn, this negligible success in agriculture perpetuated the decline of morale 
during the later Mao years.  The emerging division in Mao’s party and the questioning of his 
policies placed more political pressure on him to maintain the support of the masses.  The 
farmers were beginning to notice that Mao’s policies were not leading to the economic and 
 
13 Ruo, 1963, A Minor Correction, 15. 
14 Criticize the Reactionary Thought of Lin Biao and Confucius, Firmly Walk with the Workers and Peasants on the 
Road of Unity. 
15 Chen, Yonggui. 1967. “Dazhai Advances under the Glory of Mao Zedong Thought.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
16 Ibid., 15. 
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logistical success that they were promised.  In order to maintain control, Mao needed enemies 
and unity against these enemies, as evidenced by the quote. Still, what Mao needed to legitimize 
himself as the supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party was the peasants to believe that 
they could achieve greatness in transforming nature.   
  Placing Mao Above Nature 
In light of this, one of the propaganda tactics to legitimize Mao and his policies was to 
place the supreme leader within an idealized landscape.  Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan (Fig. 3-
3) is arguably the most impactful propaganda poster of the entire Maoist Era.17  As millions of 
copies of the poster were printed and plastered all over the mainland, it is understandable why 
Chairman Mao was universally idolized during the CR.  The image portrays a young Mao 
marching onward through the countryside to attend a miner strike in Anyuan.  Mao’s complexion 
implies his engaging, goal-oriented mind while his eyes are looking towards the future and what 
is in front of him.  The surrounding landscape distorts our sight by adding height to his outer 
appearance.  Mao’s height is exaggerated to the extent that his head is fully surrounded by the 
clouds in the sky.   In this sense, the image portrays Mao as a symbolic ruler by making him look 
taller and designing the mountains to appear smaller.  Therefore, we can reflect that Chairman 
Mao Goes to Anyuan conveys a strong sense of inspiration for the masses.  They too can 
successfully move mountains as their great leader did.  Similarly, Chairman Mao Inspects the 
Guangdong Countryside (Fig. 3-4) advocates transforming nature in such a manner.18  However, 
rather than placing Mao in a landscape that feels diminutive, Chairman Mao Inspects the 
 
17 Liu, Chunhua. 1968. “Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan.” Beijing: Hebei People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e12-703. 
18 Chen, Yanning. 1972. “Chairman Mao Inspects the Guangdong Countryside.” Beijing: University of Westminster 
Chinese Poster Collection. https://library-artstor-org.ezproxy.uvm.edu/#/asset/AAPDIG_10312352053. 
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Guangdong Countryside locates Mao in an idealized countryside to highlight the achievement of 
Mao’s environmental policy in action.  Corresponding with Mao’s appearance in the center of 
the image, Mao’s height elevates him to the highest status among the other individuals.  His 
white shirt appears brighter in contrast to the surrounding colors, and that different saturation 
makes him the most eye-catching figure in the image.  The commoners following Mao and the 
surrounding landscape express agricultural prosperity and demonstrate following Mao’s ideology 
in transforming nature.  
While it is not possible to fully determine the exact psychological effect of placing Mao 
within such landscapes in that manner, the strategy was employed by the CCP to a significant 
degree.  Given that Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan was printed over 900 million times, Mao’s 
role in influencing the public-oriented mission to transform nature is undeniable.  This artistic 
technique of separating the status of human beings with nature represents continuity of 
Confucian philosophy, contrary to the numerous times which Mao and his administration 
condemned Confucianism.  Portraying Mao as far superior to nature as the posters and the 
newspaper did show that Mao’s environmental policy did contain elements of anthropocentrism. 
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Chapter 3 Images 
Figure 3-1:  Unknown, Author. 1970. “The Arid and Poor Hillside Turned into a Productive 
‘Dazhaitian’ Ditches Fill Trenches to Create Land, Gaining Grain Production and Increasing 
Production Year after Year.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2:  Che, Yongren, and Huali Yu. 1974. “Criticize the Reactionary Thought of Lin Biao 
and Confucius, Firmly Walk with the Workers and Peasants on the Road of Unity.” Tianjin: 
Tianjin People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e13-851 
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Figure 3-3:  Liu, Chunhua. 1968. “Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan.” Beijing: Hebei People’s 
Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e12-703. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Chen, Yanning. 1972. “Chairman Mao Inspects the Guangdong Countryside.” 
Beijing: University of Westminster Chinese Poster Collection. https://library-artstor-
org.ezproxy.uvm.edu/#/asset/AAPDIG_10312352053. 
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Chapter 4: Emerging Norms of 
Afforestation and Conservation 
Restoration of Forested Land  
 While there are some overlaps between Judith Shapiro’s findings and mine which reveal 
the anthropocentric politics of Mao’s government, they do not suggest that all facets of Mao’s 
environmental policy were anti-nature and anthropocentric.  For example, when discussing Learn 
from Dazhai in the Cultural Revolution, Shapiro mainly describes the negative environmental 
impacts of the movement––such as cases of forestry loss and the slogans that advocated tree 
cutting.1  What had been underdiscussed, however, is the advocacy of afforestation, especially 
during the 1960s and 1970s.   It is worth pointing out that the excessive loss of forest during the 
Maoist Era was the result of maximizing efficiency of the land.  The CCP did not intend to 
overcut and underplant trees for the benefit of harming nature.  In other words, geography was 
intended to serve agriculture and material purposes,2 but the Chinese did not possess any 
particular vitriol towards forested land.  Logging during the Maoist Era should not be considered 
as a practice that intended to harm nature but an anthropocentric practice that failed to account 
for the environmental consequences of deforestation.  Forests were viewed as assets to 
agriculture because they protected against soil erosion and were viewed as potential sites for 
arable land.  Therefore, forests were not necessarily considered wasted land by the CCP.3  
Following an evaluation of China’s forestry conditions in 1961, Li Fanwu in the People’s Daily 
raised concern that China’s forest reserves and their respective resources will fail to support the 
 
1 Shapiro, 2001, Mao’s War Against Nature, 112.  
2 Luo, Wencai. 1958. “Ask for Food from Barren Hills and Mountains.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
3 Unknown, Author. 1957. “Greening the Motherland.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
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national economy and China’s large population in the coming years.4  The same piece argues that 
China’s consumption of forest resources cannot compromise future generations in their access of 
these same resources,5 a principle that is called “sustainability,” in the present.   In these lights 
we can reflect that the Chinese possessed at least a rudimentary understanding regarding the 
importance of forests in limiting soil erosion during the GLF.  Forests were capable of 
“regulating the climate,” though the usage of this vague language suggests that the CCP did not 
fully understand the importance of forests as carbon sinks.6  Furthermore, after analyzing the 
newspaper archive, I am still unsure as to whether or not the CCP possessed a deeper ecological 
understanding of the relationship between tree coverage and soil erosion suggesting that they 
were not exposed to such ecological theories.  In summary, there is some evidence that the 
Chinese started promoting environmental conservation and sustainability in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 In the eyes of Mao Zedong, transforming nature was more than just the removal of forests 
for agriculture.  In actuality, afforestation, that is, the planting of trees to create forests, was 
considered to be within the realm of gaizao ziran.  For example, Mao’s CCP knew that 
mitigating Inner Mongolia’s 16 percent desert expansion could be accomplished through 
afforestation.  This desert in Inner Mongolia was referred as the “Yellow Dragon,” in the 
People’s Daily.7  Treating nature as one giant organism, such as this “Yellow Dragon,” is an 
aspect of Fengshui––in other words, Chinese geomancy.  Fengshui emphasizes harmonizing 
human beings with their environment, so it is possible Maoist China was influenced by such 
doctrinal values.  Furthermore, it is also possible the CCP did promote some degree of a 
 
4 Li, Fanwu. 1961. “How Fast and Economical to Carry out Forest Regeneration.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
5 Ibid., 8.  
6 Ibid., 8. 
7 Wang, Zaitian. 1960. “A Huge Victory in Transforming Nature.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
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harmonious relationship with nature, though further evaluation is needed to shed light on the 
attitudes towards Chinese geomancy during the Maoist Era.   
Propaganda played an instrumental role in educating the Chinese masses about 
afforestation, its benefits to agriculture, and its benefits for the overall well-being of the people.  
For example, tree-planting was treated as a competition among labor forces which had a startling 
parallel with the provincial competition to produce the most grain.8  Afforestation was regularly 
referred as Lühua zuguo which translates to “Greening the Motherland,” in English.9  Marking 
afforestation in this manner parallels the goal of renovating the “Yellow Dragon.”  Lühua zuguo 
was not only found in textual propaganda, but in visual propaganda as well.  Figure 4-1 shows a 
hard-working peasant woman carrying what appears to be wood.  The caption reads “Greening 
the Motherland is good, women want to win glory for afforestation.”10  The image, published in 
1960, shows that a desire for afforestation was even present during the Leap, despite the socio-
political popularity of logging.   
Ultimately, however, the mission to persuade the Chinese peasants to “Green the 
Motherland,” was not very successful.   The Chinese were removing trees at a much faster rate 
than the trees were being replenished, explaining the decline of forest cover.   Additionally, the 
swift, sweeping afforestation plan that was utilized disregarded important factors such as soil 
content, distance between seeds, and water quality.11   The People’s Daily does not provide any 
indication that the Chinese farmers understood the importance of planting indigenous tree 
species in deforested areas.  Normally, non-native trees take far more time to grow than natives, 
 
8 Wang, 1960, A Huge Victory in Transforming Nature, 7. 
9 Ibid., 7. 
10Yin, Rongsheng. 1960. “Greening the Motherland Is Good, Women Want to Win Glory for Afforestation.” 
Beijing: People’s Daily. 
11 Unknown, Author. 1965. “One-Day Afforestation. Beijing: People’s Daily.” 
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if they succeed at all.  In 1963, it was claimed that 907,800 acres of forest was added in Dianbai 
County in only 8 years.12  As always with the People’s Daily, however, it is impossible to verify 
the truth of this statistic.  It is known that, throughout the 1960s, forest coverage continued to 
decline in China, with total coverage reaching a low-point of 12 percent in 1970.13  Coupled with 
Mao’s suppression of the intellectual class, China’s afforestation campaign proved to be 
ineffective in substantially restoring forests until the years following Mao’s death.   
Mao’s Environmental Policy Extends Beyond Material Purpose 
 Despite the lack of visible forest expansion, Greening the Motherland was not entirely 
unsuccessful in shifting the mindset of the Chinese people.  Norms of environmental 
conservation began to become more widespread in the years following the GLF.  In his book, 
Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Jacques Ellul describes Mao’s Theory of the 
Mold.  This theory was the foundation of Mao’s propaganda mission, which sought to use 
widespread political indoctrination to shape the Chinese communists so that they were 
ideologically the same person.14 As an individual, Mao also believed that he could mold nature 
into something very helpful to his politics.  While the primary objective of afforestation tailored 
towards successful agriculture and lumber supply, the mission to Green the Motherland 
expanded the ideals of environmental conservation.15  Meaning, the Chinese began to advocate 
protecting nature for reasons other than for material benefit in an effort to advance Fengshui by 
aiming at establishing a greater harmonious relationship with the natural world.  
 
12 Lin, Xuan. 1963. “Afforestation Changed the Economic Outlook of Dianbai County.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
13 Shapiro, 2001, Mao’s War Against Nature, 82. 
14 Ellul, Jacques. 1973. Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. New York: Vintage Books. 
15 People’s Database Information. 1962. “Guangzhi Fast-Growing Forest Trees -Domestic Short Review.”  Beijing: 
People’s Daily. 
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During the Great Leap Forward, the most remarkable achievement of the Chinese 
regarding environmental conservation was through the promotion of afforestation for the purpose 
of agriculture.  However, the purpose of afforestation shifted in multiple ways following the 
GLF, as the efforts to restore forests failed due to the CCP’s absence of expertise in agriculture.  
First, the tone of the articles discussing China’s poor forest reserves was much more alarmed 
following the GLF and, therefore, there was more urgency to plant trees.16,17  The mission to 
‘Green the Motherland’ became far more widespread as well.  Both Figures 4-2 and 4-3 both 
call for an upsurge in the planting of trees, though the background landscapes devoid of tree 
cover shows that there is still a long road ahead towards recovery.18,19  Moreover, as the purpose 
of reconstructing forests was no longer solely for filling barren mountains or increasing farming 
yields, there was comparatively more focus on the aesthetic appeal of forestry expansion and 
improving the scenery of China’s landscape.20      
Consistent with the increased criticism in the rhetoric during the Cultural Revolution, 
articles in the People’s Daily condemned slash and burn-style farming,21 and the lack of laws and 
regulations that protect forests.22  Slash and burn refers to the farming method of incinerating and 
cutting down trees to create arable land––a farming practice that is widely regarded as unethical.  
China wanted to break free from these farming procedures:  
 
16 People’s Database Information, 1962, Guangzhi Fast-Growing Forest Trees, 21. 
17 Dong, Zhiyong. 1964. “Forestry Construction Is a Key Measure to Fundamentally Solve China’s Agricultural 
Problems.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
18 Unknown, Designer. 1973. “Make the Motherland Green - It Is Everybody’s Responsibility to Take Good Care of 
Trees!” Beijing: Beijing Municipal Parks Office. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-418. 
19 Wang, Tiecheng, and PRC Ministry of Forestry Propaganda Office. 1970. “Start a New Upsurge of the People’s 
Duty of Tree Planting Movement.” Beijing: China Environmental Science Press. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-197b-001. 
20 Ibid., 21. 
21 Xinhua News Agency. 1970. “From Slash and Burn to the Hometown of Tea and Rice: The Deeds of Yunnan 
Construction Brigade to Build Awa Mountain.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
22 Unknown, Author. 1963. “Protecting the Forest is Everyone’s Responsibility.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
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They are determined to change the habit of destroying forests and opening wastelands.23 
 
In this sense, Learn from Dazhai was the precursor to the emerging norms of environmental 
protection during the Cultural Revolution.  In her criticism of Learn from Dazhai, Shapiro 
includes a quote from a professor at a Chinese agricultural university, who was sent to survey the 
land-use in Western Sichuan province during the 1970s.24  Although the scientist’s quote 
suggests that overreliance on growing wheat led to desertification, I found the fact that he was 
sent there in general to be highly significant.  This professor was sent to Western Sichuan to 
learn the laws of nature and to study nature, to better understand how these problems arose.  
Therefore, the Chinese did exert some amount of effort to mitigate the land-use change, even if 
the outcome was limited.    
The destruction of China’s forests occurred through an unreasonable Chinese economic 
system.  Dazhai sought to reform this economic system by emphasizing the importance of 
preserving the existing forests in addition to afforestation.  Planting trees without protecting 
existing forest cover was considered a “wasted effort.”25  Fixing this backwardness extended 
beyond afforestation as well.  One poster from 1972 captured a jovial coal miner with a cart 
filled with coal.  It is captioned: “Struggle to Reverse the Situation Where Coal is Mined in the 
North and Transported to the South,” (Fig. 4-4).26  In this sense, the poster may be calling for 
coal expansion in the south to fix the transportation issue.  However, the overall message that 
conveys distaste with the reliance on coal remains intact.  Coal mining was critical to the 
 
23 Unknown, 1963, Protecting the Forest is Everyone’s Responsibility, 22. 
24 Shapiro, 2001, Mao’s War Against Nature, 113. 
25 Unknown, 1963, Protecting the Forest is Everyone’s Responsibility, 22. 
26 Yi, Fasheng, and Chenlei Wu. 1972. “Struggle to Reverse the Situation That Coal Is Mined in the North and 
Transported to the South.” Hubei: Hubei People’s Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/e37-201. 
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expansion of the Chinese economy, so such criticisms of coal mining in propaganda posters are 
exceedingly rare and noteworthy.           
One of the most prominent advocates of environmental conservation in China during the 
Cultural Revolution was renowned ornithologist Zheng Zuoxin.  In response to the direct attack 
on his discipline, Zheng vehemently opposed the Communist Party’s Great Leap Forward pest 
campaign to eliminate all sparrows.  Zheng was, of course, blacklisted as a reactionary by the 
CCP for his criticisms of China’s Four Pest’s Campaign.27  Even so, the CCP continued to allow 
Zheng to publish his arguments in the People’s Daily.  Zheng’s opinion pieces scrutinized the 
disregard of biodiversity by the CCP, a topic that was rarely discussed in other newspaper 
articles.  Along with his policy criticisms, Zheng advocated new policy implementations of:  
tighter hunting restrictions, the establishment of new research departments to study ecology, and 
the construction of nature preserves.28  Although the reason of the People’s Daily’s decision to 
publish articles written by a man who was labeled as a counter-revolutionary remains unknown, 
Zheng somehow managed to appeal to Maoism by arguing that protecting wild animals was a 
crucial step for understanding and eventually transforming nature.  Additionally, Zheng argued 
that the CCP should use propaganda to promote values of biodiversity and natural resource 
conservation.29  Most notably, his relentless efforts to persuade the CCP to pay better attention to 
the environmental consequences of their actions resulted in the removal of sparrows from the 
Four Pest’s Campaign.30  This provided further evidence that the CCP believed Zheng Zuoxin’s 
 
27 Hao, Zhang. 2019. The Man Who Saved Sparrows From Catastrophe. China Global Television Network. 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514f34596a4e32457a6333566d54/index.html 
28 Zheng, Zuoxin. 1962. “Reasonable Use and Protection of Wild Animal Resources.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
29Ibid., 24. 
30 Ibid., 23. 
82 
 
arguments had merit and which resulted in environmental conservation becoming normative 
during the Cultural Revolution. 
Artists Returning to Nature as a Vessel of Beauty  
 With this evolving aspiration for greater environmental protection in the Cultural 
Revolution, The CCP gave propaganda artists greater freedom in their artistic depictions of 
nature.  The later Mao years represented a shift back to the former ways of treating nature as a 
vessel for beauty.  This reactionary shift towards appreciating the aesthetic appeal of the natural 
world is the most dramatic shift in propaganda art in the Maoist Era.  Nature was not only 
depicted with greater realism, but also with a far more positive connotation as well.  In Stefan 
Landsberger’s extensive poster archive, there are a few examples of propaganda art that 
emphasize the beauty of undisturbed mountain features.  Daybreak of Spring over the Kunlun 
Mountains (Fig. 4-5), is one such poster with a tone that treats nature in a benign way.31  Printed 
in 1972, the intention of the artist Fang Jizhong was to bring out the beauty of the Kunlun 
Mountains in northern Xinjiang and the glistening snow on top of them.  The print itself feels 
much more like aesthetic art rather than propaganda, as its aesthetic is not intervened by the 
political doctrines.  Although it is difficult to determine how Figure 4-5 became a propaganda 
print, it is remarkable that the CCP allowed it to be printed.  In this sense, we can reflect that 
Daybreak of Spring over the Kunlun Mountains made strong implications to the developing 
norms of environmental conservation in the late Cultural Revolution.  
 
31 Fang, Jizhong. 1972. “Daybreak of Spring over the Kunlun Mountains.” People’s Fine Arts Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/d25-1. 
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 Similar to the peaceful depiction of nature within Daybreak of Spring over the Kunlun 
Mountains, several propaganda prints that portray Mao’s residence in Shaoshan also emphasize 
the beauty of nature.  In these prints, Chairman Mao’s abode was displayed as a modest and 
quaint residence surrounded by a lush and verdant forest.  Uniquely, his house is not the defining 
feature of the scene.  The forested landscape appears far larger in these prints and therefore 
emphasizes the natural and sacred beauty of Shaoshan.  The prints convey a feeling of peace and 
innocuousness, and ultimately associate Chairman Mao with a legacy of peace.  Such features 
imply the antithetical impulse to the dominant strategy of placing human features at the top of 
the hierarchy within propaganda.  The Shaoshan prints and their relationship with the beauty of 
nature can be best exemplified by The Pine Trees of Shaoshan (Fig. 4-6).32  The tall and strong 
stature of the pine trees in this poster remind us of the transmission lines in the posters I 
discussed in Chapter 1.  However, the pine trees have the central focal point in The Pine Trees of 
Shaoshan, as opposed to man-made features.  In The Pine Trees of Shaoshan, Guan Shanyue 
emphasizes that both Mao’s home and the surrounding environment are sacred.  The Pine Trees 
of Shaoshan was printed in 1977, one year after Mao’s death, making it the most recently 
published poster I have included in my analysis.  Overall, the image represents a dramatic shift in 
China’s attitude towards nature and is one of the strongest precursors to the environmental 
conservation efforts that contemporary China is implementing.      
 
 
 
32 Guan, Shanyue. 1977. “The Pine Trees of Shaoshan.” Hunan: Hunan People’s Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1977-002. 
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Chapter 4 Images 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Yin, Rongsheng. 1960. “Greening the Motherland Is Good, Women Want to Win 
Glory for Afforestation.” Beijing: People’s Daily. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Designer, Unknown. 1973. “Make the Motherland Green - It Is Everybody’s 
Responsibility to Take Good Care of Trees!” Beijing: Beijing Municipal Parks Office. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-418. 
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Figure 4-3:   Wang, Tiecheng, and PRC Ministry of Forestry Propaganda Office. 1970. “Start a 
New Upsurge of the People’s Duty of Tree Planting Movement.” Beijing: China Environmental 
Science Press. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-197b-001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4:  Yi, Fasheng, and Chenlei Wu. 1972. “Struggle to Reverse the Situation That Coal Is 
Mined in the North and Transported to the South.” Hubei: Hubei People’s Publishing House. 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e37-201. 
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Figure 4-5:  Fang, Jizhong. 1972. “Daybreak of Spring over the Kunlun Mountains.” People’s 
Fine Arts Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/d25-1. 
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Figure 4-6:   Guan, Shanyue. 1977. “The Pine Trees of Shaoshan.” Hunan: Hunan People’s 
Publishing House. https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1977-002. 
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Legacy & Conclusion  
 The Maoist Era was a long and strenuous slog to bring China out of the economic and 
political turmoil of the early 20th century, ultimately failing to accomplish both of those 
objectives.  Following Chairman Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping took over a struggling 
nation and sought to clean up the challenging economic situation perpetuated by Chairman Mao.  
China pivoted to a top-down mercantilist economy centered around an emerging manufacturing 
sector fueled by China’s rich coal reserves.  Under the administration of the CCP, China saw 
immense economic growth in only a few decades.  While the economic system itself shifted 
dramatically under Deng’s government, the ideals of utopian urgency remained popular enough 
to perpetuate the immense environmental pitfalls, particularly regarding air quality.  When I was 
young, I remember hearing about the dust and smog that covered the mainland every year.  
Pictures of Chinese citizens wearing facemasks surrounded by Beijing’s dense smog could be 
found all over the mainstream media.   
 Historical analyses of Maoist Era environmental policy, such as the one I have provided, 
are important because the fundamental aspects of Mao’s environmental policy are still heavily 
rampant in contemporary Chinese society.  The methodology of utopian urgency that prioritized 
efficiency at any cost should be considered crucial for China to be the world’s largest carbon 
dioxide emitter in the 21st century.  Nevertheless, those emerging norms of environmental 
conservation that I discussed in Chapter 4 did persist into the modern era.  In the past decade, 
China has reversed the expulsion of environmental remediation in the nationwide politics and 
attempted to respond to existing environmental damages.  In 2014, the Chinese Communist 
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Party, under administration of the newly elected President Xi Jinping, declared war on pollution.1  
To the Chinese, it proclaimed a new era of sustainability and a service-based economy that 
oriented them to compete with global superpowers, such as the United States.  While the war on 
pollution is still in its infancy, early analyses suggest that China is indeed winning the war, and is 
far ahead of schedule as well.  For example, concentrations of air pollution have fallen 
dramatically since 2013, by as much as 36 percent in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region.2  Much 
of the swift progress is attributed to rapidly shutting down the manufacturing plants that emit 
coal into the atmosphere through smokestacks.  Similarly, manufacturing output has declined in 
that same region by as much as 9.6 percent since the declaration of war on pollution.3  In 
addition, China has also implemented sweeping reforms to phase out coal in favor of a somewhat 
cleaner resource––Natural Gas.  But, most importantly, there has been more nationwide attention 
of the public towards air pollution since 2013, as the Chinese Communist Party started to 
valorize the environmental conservation practices.4   
 Also, the implementation of environmental policy by the CCP has changed substantially 
following Mao’s death.  Under Mao’s administration, policy implementation rested primarily on 
the shoulders of the peasant class.  Today, the CCP devises policy measures and thrusts them 
upon the local party cadres to enforce, while the average citizen possesses little to no 
involvement in the decision-making process.  However, while China’s environmental 
improvements in the last seven years are noticeable, there are several caveats with a top-down 
 
1 Greenstone, Michael, and Patrick Schwarz. 2018. “Is China Winning Its War on Pollution?” Air Quality Life Index. 
Chicago. 
2 Greenstone, Michael, and Schwarz, 2018, Is China Winning, 5. 
3 Li, Xiao, Yuanbo Qiao, and Lei Shi. 2019. “Has China’s War on Pollution Slowed the Growth of Its 
Manufacturing and by How Much? Evidence from the Clean Air Action.” China Economic Review 53 (August 
2018): 271–89. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2018.08.015. 
4 Saikawa, Eri. 2019. “China’s Continued War on Pollution.” China Research Center. 2019. 
https://www.chinacenter.net/2019/china_currents/18-1/chinas-continued-war-on-air-pollution/. 
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environmental policy approach that are often underdiscussed.  This top-down approach of swift, 
aggressive environmental policy was first discussed in detail by Bruce Gilley, who debunks 
China’s policy by labeling it as “authoritarian environmentalism.”5  China’s system of 
authoritarian environmentalism produces policy outputs at an alarming rate, though Gilley argues 
that authoritarian environmentalism has had far less success in creating policy outcomes.6  
Giving the local party officials sole decision-making power often limits these outcomes that 
Gilley mentions due to a multitude of reasons.  First, the turnover of party cadres is very high as 
many party officials transfer to a new location frequently in less than five years.7  Strong policy 
outcomes require cooperation with local residents and perhaps, more importantly, ample time for 
implementation.  Secondly, local party officials often prioritize economic development over 
environmental conservation because the economy is more determinant for their favorability 
ratings.  Thirdly, while considering environmental problems on a local scale is indeed pivotal, 
many environmental catastrophes occur across municipal boundaries and mitigation, therefore, 
requires cooperation between different municipalities, something highly lacking currently.8  
Finally, the large number of new environmental regulations in China is burdensome for the local 
officials and, in turn, so are preparing for government inspections.  The problem is not that China 
does not have enough regulations; the problem is that China has far too many.9      
 
5 Gilley, Bruce. 2012. “Authoritarian Environmentalism and China’s Response to Climate Change.” Environmental 
Politics 21 (2): 287–307. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.651904. 
6 Ibid., 298. 
7 Eaton, Sarah, and Genia Kostka. 2014. “Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined? Local Leaders’ Time 
Horizons and Environmental Policy Implementation in China.” China Quarterly 218 (1): 359–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741014000356. 
8 Shen, Wei, and Dong Jiang. 2020. “Making Authoritarian Environmentalism Accountable? Understanding China’s 
New Reforms on Environmental Governance.” Journal of Environment and Development, October, 
107049652096113. https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496520961136. 
9 Ibid., 5. 
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  In light of this, there are many logistical flaws regarding China’s authoritarian 
environmentalism.  But the most critical flaw that fails the system is in the moral and ethical 
dimension.  Without allowing for participation of the Chinese masses, environmental 
conservation becomes infinitely more challenging, especially given China’s large population.  
Moreover, environmental justice issues are almost completely ignored.  Environmental justice 
can be defined as the fair and ethical treatment of individuals under environmental policies, laws, 
or regulations regardless of race, gender, or socioeconomic status.  One example of 
environmental justice issues lies within the Chinese government’s recent initiative of forcefully 
replacing old coal furnaces in residential homes with more eco-friendly natural gas furnaces.  A 
recent study showed that the new furnaces are only viewed favorably by wealthier citizens who 
can afford it:  
  Our village is a middle-income community, with about 200 households. All the 
 households have installed gas heating devices in 2017. But, due to high expenses, at most 
 20 to 30 households actually use gas for heating. The vast majority of the households 
 only use it for cooking. Too expensive! It is an unrealistic project for rural regions.10  
  
While the clean heating program has aided China in its war on pollution, it also exposes the 
glaring environmental justice issues in contemporary Chinese society.  Citizens who expressed 
disapproval with the Coal-to-Gas (CTG) Project argued that their contribution to the smog by 
burning coal is negligible compared to that of large manufacturing plants in urban areas.11  So 
far, China has shown that fundamental human rights and justices cannot be fully compatible with 
environmental conservation in order to win the war on pollution.  Moreover, consistent with 
 
10 Hu, Zhanping. 2020. “When Energy Justice Encounters Authoritarian Environmentalism: The Case of Clean 
Heating Energy Transitions in Rural China.” Energy Research and Social Science 70 (August): 101771. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101771. 
11 Ibid., 9. 
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Gilley’s arguments, this case study reflects a policy output rather than a policy outcome.  In the 
present, the CCP still frequently does not invest enough time into considering the consequences 
of their environmental policies.  Instead, they revert to utopian urgency and authoritarian 
environmentalism.       
 One might argue that the influence of Mao’s environmental policy on the present is 
negligible because current environmental policy is administered by officials rather than peasants.  
The problem with this view is that it does not consider how inherently party-centric and top-
down Chairman Mao’s environmental policy was, despite the illusion that it was participatory.  
Mao sought to mold the perfect peasant in the image of a Chinese Communist Party soldier all 
without any conflicting opinions.  Every citizen possessed the same exact environmental policy.  
Those who did not share that same policy were relentlessly ostracized by the CCP.  The common 
Chinese citizen today has only slightly more decision-making power than they did in the Maoist 
Era.  In a way, the cadres are similar to the masses in the Maoist Era as they are forced to either 
perform seemingly insurmountable tasks to satisfy the CCP or face political consequences.  
Furthermore, although the propaganda today is arguably not as relentless as the Cultural 
Revolution, the propaganda mission remains strong in Chinese culture.  Murals with the phrases 
“Tackle air pollution; Build green home together,” and “Small family, big nation, clean heating,” 
can be found in rural villages that have recently replaced coal heaters with new natural gas 
heaters.12  Rather than accepting a diverse array of perspectives, the CCP continues to show the 
negative results of standing against the idea of molding everyone to its own agenda.  In addition, 
 
12 Hu, 2020, When Energy Justice Encounters Authoritarian Environmentalism, 12. 
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these slogans, along with the war on pollution, show that China still frequently treats 
environmental problems as a conflict between man and nature, as described in Chapter 2.   
 Unless the CCP allows greater representation of its citizens and NGOs, it will not achieve 
the long-term environmental progress the country so desperately needs.  China has made 
remarkable progress in the short-term, though shutting down industrial facilities will not be 
sufficient for long-term progress.  The CCP can shut down factories to curb emissions, but would 
they able to foster the necessary technological innovation and public participation that are vital to 
achieve sustainable development?  Early evidence suggests that there is light at the end of the 
tunnel for China.  China is slowly becoming a world leader in solar energy generation, 
investment, and technology.  In 2017, China finished constructing the world’s largest floating 
solar farm, on top of flooded land that was once occupied by a coal mine.13  The solar farm has 
even had a positive impact beyond China’s borders as it has incentivized South Korea to begin 
constructing an even larger farm.14  In addition, China has also been cultivating large quantities 
of Gracilaria seaweed to combat eutrophication in streams and to serve as a carbon sink.15 
Despite such achievements, the road towards sufficient innovation is long.  The desire to take 
control over land remains intact as fertilizer use in Chinese agriculture is still extremely 
excessive.16   
 Regarding representation in environmental policy-making, the Non-Governmental 
Organizations with environmental conservation ideals are beginning to gain influence.   
 
13 Pouran, Hamid M. 2018. “From Collapsed Coal Mines to Floating Solar Farms, Why China’s New Power Stations 
Matter.” Energy Policy 123 (July): 414–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.09.010. 
14 Ibid., 418. 
15 Yang, Yufeng, Zhaoyang Chai, Qing Wang, Weizhou Chen, Zhili He, and Shijun Jiang. 2015. “Cultivation of 
Seaweed Gracilaria in Chinese Coastal Waters and Its Contribution to Environmental Improvements.” Algal 
Research 9 (December 2017): 236–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.algal.2015.03.017. 
16 Saikawa, 2019, China’s Continued War, 6/9. 
94 
 
Although one might argue that their influence has been negligible, it is important to consider that 
the majority of China’s environmental NGOs were founded in the late 1990s and early 2000s and 
the CCP tightly restricted their policy-influencing power up until only a few years ago.  In a case 
study published in 2020, Gao and Teets found that Green Zhejiang, a grass-roots environmental 
advocacy NGO, successfully aided the provincial government of Zhejiang in implementing water 
pollution regulations while simultaneously mobilizing citizens to become savvier about reporting 
water pollution issues.17  The transformative impact of Green Zhejiang signifies a step in the 
right direction for China.  It will be enthralling to see if environmental NGOs are able to 
continue to emerge in China and if these organizations are able to expand their role as 
stakeholders.   
For future research, I would like the scholarly community to develop a deeper 
understanding of why China drastically shifted its environmental policy in the last decade.  A 
few questions that could be investigated are as follows: What motivates the Chinese Communist 
Party’s environmental policy initiatives in the present?  What will likely motivate them in the 
future?  As the People’s Daily and propaganda images remain state-controlled in contemporary 
China, the Chinese people continue to be influenced by rhetorical and visual cues to transform 
nature.  Interdisciplinary scholars could potentially make comparisons with the historical 
analysis that I have provided and investigate modern-day environmental policy messages in the 
People’s Daily.  Also, further exploring the murals that Hu Zhanping describes in his case study 
 
17 Gao, Xiang, and Jessica Teets. 2020. “Civil Society Organizations in China: Navigating the Local Government for 
More Inclusive Environmental Governance.” China Information, March, 0920203X2090811. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0920203X20908118. 
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would shed light on the present-day communication of environmental policy, especially in rural 
areas where much of the population remains uneducated.18       
These research questions need greater attention because global environmental problems 
are becoming more prevalent and impactful.  As China continues to remain one of the world’s 
largest polluters, domestic environmental improvements can also have a global impact.   
Some loose ends remain after this project. At the moment, I am still unsure if the present-
day Chinese Communist Party purely cares about the environment, or if their actions are solely 
attributed to expanding regime legitimacy.  Declaring war on pollution could have simply been a 
public health initiative or a political initiative to maintain support of China’s citizens.  Despite 
the evidence I have provided, shedding light on this complex question requires even more critical 
attention.  My indications point to the conclusion that, under Mao, the CCP enforced an 
environmental policy that pitted man against nature in hopes of developing China’s economy as 
efficiently as humanly feasible.  However, in contrast to the evidence that Shapiro provides, I 
argue that Mao’s environmental policy was not a monolith.  The attitude towards nature did 
become more positive following the Great Leap Forward.  Even if it was not fully successful, 
Learn from Dazhai was an intellectual movement that sought to better understand nature and 
reform the economic policies to become less anthropocentric.  Moreover, propaganda posters in 
the 1970s showed at least some appreciation for lush natural landscapes and the aesthetic appeals 
of nature.  It is entirely possible that striving to understand the laws of nature paved way for 
China’s attention towards environmental conservation in the present. 
 
18 Hu, 2020, When Energy Justice Encounters Authoritarian Environmentalism, 12. 
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 At the time of writing this final paragraph, much of China’s Maoist-Era primary sources 
still remain undiscovered or inaccessible for analysis.  Reflecting back to my Introduction, there 
are still numerous People’s Daily newspaper articles that I have not yet been able to research.  I 
hope that, in the future, these remaining documents may be revealed and investigated so that the 
body of interdisciplinary literature can continue to expand.  In our understanding of history, 
politics, and sustainability, there is simply nowhere to go but up.   
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